Spaatz, General Carl A. (‘Tooey’)

Spaatz, General Carl A. (‘Tooey’) (1891–1974),US airman of German immigrant stock who, from January 1944, commanded the USA's strategic air forces in Europe and then its strategic air forces bombing Japan.

Spaatz was one of the earliest US military aviators. He first saw action on the Mexican border in 1916 and in France during the First World War. With the rank of colonel, he was sent to the UK in 1940 as an official observer where he was quick to realize that the Luftwaffe was misdirecting its efforts by bombing London (see Blitz), and to appreciate the quality of the RAF pilots who opposed it. His report to this effect helped convince Roosevelt that the UK could survive and should be given every possible help.

In 1941 Spaatz was promoted and appointed chief of air staff to the US Army Air Forces (USAAF) Headquarters. In January 1942 he was promoted major-general and that July he took command of Eighth USAAF in England and its Bomber Command, under Eaker, began operating in August. In November 1942 he handed over to Eaker when he was appointed Allied Air Forces commander under Eisenhower in the North African campaign and was promoted lt-general in March 1943. As well as always being a firm believer in precision daylight bombing, he became an advocate of the analysis of bombing raids of the kind carried out by the British scientist Solly Zuckerman. Their collaboration brought about the bombing of the Mediterranean island of Pantelleria along lines suggested by scientific analysis. When a unified air command for the battle of the Mediterranean was established under Tedder in February 1943, Spaatz became his deputy, and in December 1943 he was appointed C-in-C of the newly formed US Strategic Air Forces (Eighth and Fifteenth USAAF) in Europe, reporting directly to the Combined Chiefs of Staff. With them he masterminded the Combined Bomber Offensive for which he was forced to introduce new tactics, because of high losses in earlier raids such as Ploesti and Schweinfurt. Primarily, this meant the use of long-range fighters which he employed with consummate skill during early 1944. ‘He insisted that the fighters not be tied to the bombers as escorts, that they surge ahead of the bomber formations, seek out the German fighters in the air and on the ground, and destroy them’ ( M. Carver (ed.), The War Lords, London, 1976, p. 571). Within months of the introduction of long-range fighters Spaatz had turned round the war in the air over Germany, had brought the Luftwaffe to battle, and had soundly defeated it.

To facilitate the Normandy landings of June 1944 (see OVERLORD), and the Normandy campaign which followed them, the American and British strategic air forces were placed directly under Eisenhower from April to October 1944. Spaatz, ever mindful of his basic tenet that the ground battle could only be won if air supremacy was achieved, wanted to destroy the Luftwaffe by continuing to attack vital German targets, primarily oil installations. Eisenhower used the bombers to isolate the landing beaches from reinforcements, but was persuaded by Spaatz that they should continue to be used against Germany whenever possible. In fact, by D-Day the Luftwaffe had already been decimated by Spaatz's long-range fighters. But the tactic of continuing to bomb German oil targets did ensure that the surviving fighters were forced to continue defending them so that they could not be moved to France to oppose the landings. It also caused an acute lack of fuel in Germany which became a major factor in its collapse. After Germany surrendered Spaatz, who had been promoted general in March 1945, was sent to form US Strategic Air Forces in the Pacific and to oversee the strategic air offensive against Japan which ended in atomic bombs being dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945.

Spaatz was an unassuming man who actively rejected personal publicity. This made him less well known than most of his contemporaries but only heightened the esteem in which he was held by them. This genuine modesty was no drawback when it came to high command, for he knew his own mind, was decisive in utilizing this knowledge, was in awe of no one, and had the capability of thinking big.

He succeeded General Arnold as commander of the USAAF in 1946 and became the first chief of staff of the independent US Air Force in September 1947. He retired in April 1948.

Bibliography

Mets, D. R. , A Master of Air Power (Calif., 1988).