Soviet exiles at war. The German armed forces made use of Soviet citizens because of manpower shortages. Very rapidly this became a political matter and heralded attempts to alter Nazi policy towards the population of the USSR.
The unprovoked attack by the Third Reich on the USSR on 22 June 1941 (see
BARBAROSSA) produced a very confused situation. Stalin had refused to believe reports of an imminent attack. Troops were unprepared. While some units fought valiantly against the invader, others surrendered or deserted to the German side, their attitude to the invasion reflecting the unpopularity of Stalin's regime. The civilian population, which often greeted the German troops as liberators, was convinced that the Germans understood what had been happening within the Soviet Union and were coming to free them from Stalinist tyranny. Between June and November 1941 the Germans took more than 3,800,000
prisoners-of-war (POW).
Throughout the
German–Soviet war the position of Soviet citizens under the jurisdiction of the Third Reich was influenced by the assumptions underlying German policy towards the USSR and the occupied territories (
Ostpolitik). The origins of this policy can be found in
Mein Kampf, in which Hitler maintained that the German nation needed living-space (
Lebensraum) which could only be found in the east. In Soviet Bolshevism he saw the embodiment of the aspirations of world Jewry to achieve global domination, and he viewed the Slavs as an inferior race. All achievements of the Soviet state, he argued, were a result of the influence of the German minority (see
Volksdeutsche). Slavs were to be used to serve Germany's interests and the USSR was to be exploited to the same end. These views received further elaboration after the outbreak of the German–Soviet war and resulted in the implementation of a very harsh policy in the occupied territories, particularly by party fanatics such as Erich Koch, the
Gauleiter of the Ukraine.
Because Hitler regarded the Slavs as inferior to the Aryans, he considered that they should not be afforded the privilege of serving in the German armed forces. Furthermore, he did not believe that it was worth considering any of the political aspirations of the population of the USSR as these people were not capable of appreciating and did not need the benefits of a freer or more just society.
Increasingly, this view came to be challenged by German officers on the Eastern Front who saw that the unmerciful treatment of the population was not in the German interest. The population, too, had realized, by the winter of 1941, that Nazi policy saw the whole situation in racist terms. This stiffened resistance. Some German officers such as
Kleist tried to find a way to alter Nazi policy so that the population would meet with less harsh treatment and anti-Stalinist feelings might be utilized for German benefit. To this end, Fremde Heere Ost, the section of the German Army High Command dealing with intelligence in the USSR, looked for a potential leader for a Russian Liberation movement and on 12 July 1942 a suitable candidate,
General Vlasov, was captured. He was sent to a camp for high-ranking POW in Vinnitsa where he met other Soviet officers, opposed to the Stalinist regime and was visited by German officers, one of whom, Captain Wilfred Strik-Strikfeldt, became Vlasov's friend and protector. These German officers persuaded Vlasov to write a letter to the Nazi authorities pointing out that anti-Stalinist feeling should be utilized in such a way that Soviet citizens did not feel themselves to be
traitors and that an anti-Stalinist movement would still have to be patriotic. His argument was not understood by the authorities, who moved Vlasov to the German High Command's propaganda centre at Viktoriastrasse in Berlin, where attempts were made to make him write appeals to Soviet soldiers to defect.
In December 1942 Vlasov signed the so-called Smolensk Declaration which was dropped on the German side of the Eastern Front. This document spoke of the need to form a Russian Liberation Army to fight Stalin. It reached Soviet citizens serving in the Wehrmacht and they took it as a sign that German policy towards the USSR was changing. This propaganda move was followed by further attempts to show that there was considerable support for a political, not a racial, approach towards the population of the occupied territories. In the spring of 1943 Vlasov was allowed to visit towns such as Pskov and Riga, and he issued an ‘Open Letter’ explaining why he had decided to oppose Stalin. He was greeted with great enthusiasm by the local population, but Hitler disapproved of this display of Russian
nationalism and on 18 April 1943
Keitel issued an order forbidding further trips. Then, at the Berghof conference in June 1943, Hitler forbade all further attempts to form a Russian army; Vlasov was kept under virtual house arrest and all activity was confined to the training camp at Dabendorf, set up by Colonel Claus von Stauffenberg in 1942.
The question of using Russians was brought up again in 1944, when Standartenführer ( Colonel) Günther d'Alquen, an
SS officer who had been dealing with propaganda on the Eastern Front, raised the matter with
Himmler. A meeting was arranged for 21 July but the meeting was postponed to 16 September because of the attempt to assassinate Hitler (see
Schwarze Kapelle). At this meeting Himmler agreed to the formation of Russian divisions and a Committee for the Liberation of the Peoples of Russia (Komitet Osvobozhdeniya Narodov Rossii, or KONR) which produced the Prague Manifesto, the main programme of the movement published in Prague on 14 November 1944. But it came too late, as the Germans no longer occupied any areas of the USSR, and the population of these areas was therefore not available to support the movement. The manifesto presented a fourteen-point programme and tried to explain why its adherents had considered it their duty to fight Stalin in the best interests of Russia. Despite Nazi pressure to do so, the authors of the manifesto avoided any derogatory reference to the Jews.
The period following the publication of the manifesto saw the KONR and the Germans seeking different aims. The KONR argued that Himmler had originally promised that ten divisions could be formed, not the two divisions finally agreed upon. Also, the Russian commanders had no wish to be used as cannon fodder and tried to discuss ways in which all anti-communist forces might unite against Stalin. The Germans, on the other hand, saw the KONR divisions as last-ditch reinforcements and had no time for the committee's political aspirations. In January 1945 two Russian KONR divisions were formed under Vlasov. The 2nd KONR Division never saw active service, but 1st KONR Division fought with the Czech nationalists in
Prague in May 1945 against Wehrmacht and SS troops stationed there. When it became clear that the Americans were not going to advance on the Czech capital, the division left Prague and tried to enter the American zone of Germany, but was refused permission to do so. Vlasov then gave the order to disband and approximately half his force fled westward while others turned eastward towards the advancing Red Army and were captured by it.
Other units were also formed from Soviet citizens who fought on the German side. The principal ones were:
Osttruppen
The earliest form of co-operation between Soviet citizens and the Wehrmacht took the form of auxiliary troops (
Hilfswillige, or ‘Hiwis’), who worked in non-combatant positions: drivers, ammunition carriers, grooms, translators. They were recruited as a result of decisions made at the level of divisional commanders or below who incorporated Soviet civilians or military personnel into their formations; they, in their turn, were glad to escape some of the privations of prison life. Gradually, these auxiliaries were utilized in military capacities as local militia, against Soviet partisans and even as regular units with German officers. These troops had been acquired through unofficial channels, and the statistics were not accurate, so that the Nazi authorities did not realize the extent to which these subhumans (
Untermenschen) were playing a role in the Wehrmacht. However, their role was officially recognized on 15 December 1942 when General Heinz Hellmich was appointed General der Osttruppen under the aegis of the organization section of the German Army High Command (OKH). In 1943 he was replaced by General Ernst Köstring and on 1 January 1944 this post was renamed General der Freiwilligeverbände (volunteer units). It is estimated that there were more than 800,000 Soviet nationals in the Wehrmacht by the end of the war. They manned anti-aircraft guns and filled noncombatant roles. By the end of 1943 it was not uncommon for a German battalion to contain a company of
Osttruppen.
Ostlegionen
The use of non-Slav troops was authorized by the Nazi authorities in 1941. The formation of these legions represented a major victory for the ministry of the Eastern Occupied Territories (Ostministerium).
Alfred Rosenberg, in charge of this ministry, argued that in the future a truncated Russian state, Muscovy, should be surrounded by a ring of buffer states of the non-Russian nationalities of the USSR. He fostered collaborationist movements within these areas and promoted the use of military formations. He opposed the use of Russians in these units or in any united anti-Soviet movement. Six national legions were formed: the Armenian, Azerbaijani, Georgian, North Caucasian, Turkestan, and Volga Tatar legions. There was also a cavalry corps of Kalmyks (who came from an area south of the Volga bordering the Caspian Sea) and a Crimean Tatar military formation. The Armenian and Azerbaijani legions were fairly homogeneous, the others contained a great many nationalities. It is not possible to give the precise strengths and locations of these formations, but they were stationed with other Wehrmacht units largely, though not exclusively, on the Eastern Front. One historian considers that the main point of forming them was for propaganda purposes.
Cossacks
These originated from communities which had existed on the frontiers of the Russian Empire, forming a social and cultural entity without being a specific national group. The main groups were the Don, Kuban, Terek, and Zaporozhian Cossacks, but there were other smaller groups from a wide range of different areas. In Nazi Germany they were in an anomalous position because they were not regarded as Slavs. Émigré Cossacks had supported Hitler in the 1920s for his anti-Bolshevism. It was argued, therefore, that Cossacks were descended from the Goths and were Aryans.
Nazi policy on the Cossacks was never consistent. Rosenberg envisaged creating ‘Cossackia’ in the Don and Volga regions, but this plan was abandoned. Attempts to establish self-governing areas in the Kuban were opposed by the Ostministerium and the SS.
On 15 April 1942, Hitler sanctioned the formation of Cossack units. A division under the command of Lt-General Helmuth von Pannwitz consisting of regiments from the Don, Kuban, Terek, and Siberia was formed. Subsequently this became the 15th Cossack cavalry corps.
Émigré Cossacks such as General P. N. Krasnov, General A. G. Shkuro, and General V. G. Naumenko sided with the Germans because Germany was the only Great Power fighting the Bolsheviks. Younger Cossacks, such as Major I. N. Kononov, who had deserted with his regiment from the Red Army and joined von Pannwitz, did not agree with the more reactionary attitudes of this older generation and tended to look to General Vlasov for leadership.
In March 1944 a directorate of Cossack forces, headed by Krasnov, was created. His forces, several thousand strong, moved through Poland and Southern Germany to the foothills of the Italian Alps. He would not agree to unite with Vlasov's forces. Von Pannwitz was sent to Yugoslavia to fight
Tito and the partisans and on 19 May 1945 he surrendered to the 2nd British Armoured Division.
The term Cossack—and Ukrainian—was often used loosely to denote Soviet citizens serving in the Wehrmacht.
Other Units
Various other units, including the Roland and Nachtigall
formations from Ukraine, were created in attempts to utilize anti-Soviet feeling. The German High Command's propaganda centre at Viktoriastrasse in Berlin was used to train those who might be willing to be involved in
collaboration. Local commanders formed small units with names like Dnieper or Volga which were used in anti-partisan warfare. Larger ones included the Russian National Army of Liberation (Russkaya Osvoboditelnaya Armiya, or RONA) led by Bronislav Kaminsky. Better known as the Kaminsky Brigade, it numbered, very approximately, some 5,000 men in 1942 and double that in 1943.
Kaminsky held sway in the Briansk–Lokot region, as a quasi-warlord, was equipped by the Germans and espoused, at least theoretically, a National Socialist platform. Mostly engaged in anti-partisan activity, he was shot in 1944 by the SS and his brigade was used in the suppression of the
Warsaw rising that August, and then disbanded. The Gil-Rodionov Brigade, also known as SS Druzhina 1, was led by a Soviet lt-colonel, Vladimir Rodionov, who deserted back to the Soviet side in 1943. The Russian National People's Army, (Russkaya Narodnaya Natsionalaya Armiya, or RNNA), first known as the Osintorf Brigade (Osintorf being where it was formed), was initially led by old émigrés, including Colonel K. G. Kromiadi, also known as Colonel Sanin, later to head Vlasov's secretariat. In 1942 Kromiadi was replaced by G. N. Zhilenkov and Colonel V. I. Boyarsky, both of whom were later closely associated with Vlasov.
Field Marshal von Brauchitsch considered that the RNNA had an important role to play on the Eastern Front.
Field Marshal von Kluge gave the go-ahead for its formation, but its German and Russian leaders found it almost impossible to co-operate in the field and the RNNA was dissolved in 1943.
At the end of the war captured Soviet nationals in German uniform—the KONR divisions, members of the
Freiwilligeverbände who considered themselves part of RONA, the Cossack Cavalry Corps, and other formations—presented a difficult problem for the western Allies. The Soviet authorities were unwilling to explain how so many of their nationals had come to fight on the side of the Germans. The western Allies, who had grown used to seeing the conflict in terms of fascist and democratic forces, did not understand the views of those who said that they had fought for Russia against the Soviet government on the German side, but were not fascists and who did not wish to be handed over to the Soviet authorities to be returned home. Under the terms of the Yalta agreement (see
ARGONAUT), those who had Soviet nationality before the
Nazi–Soviet Pact of August 1939 were to be repatriated: the British sent back approximately 2,250,000 and the Americans about 2 million. Other ranks were mostly sent to the
GUlag on arrival in the USSR, officers were shot. Vlasov, thirteen of his subordinates, and Krasnov, were tried
in camera in 1946 and hanged. As a German citizen, Pannwitz could have remained a British prisoner, but he chose to stay with his troops and in January 1947 he and five senior Cossack leaders were hanged in Moscow.
Nicholas Bethell and Nikolai Tolstoy in their books published in 1974 and 1977 (see below) raised the question of how far the British government had been aware that they were sending back men to Soviet labour camps and almost certain death. The argument advanced by the British authorities was that they had to send back captured Soviet citizens not only to comply with the agreement made at the Yalta conference in February 1945, but to guarantee the release of British POW. Tolstoy has argued that this latter reason could not have been a determining factor since it was not in Stalin's interest to reveal the extent to which the Soviet regime had been opposed by its own citizens, which would have become public knowledge if he had refused to release British POW freed by the Red Army. Tolstoy also tried to show the extent to which officials within the Northern Department of the British foreign office, as well as certain politicians and army officers, were acting in the Soviet interest, or in response to Soviet pressure. All these allegations have been denied, but the reasons behind the decision to repatriate millions of Soviet citizens have not been fully clarified.
C. Andreyev
Bibliography
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Bethell, N. , The Last Secret (New York, 1974).
Dallin, A. , German Rule in Russia (2nd edn., London, 1981).
—— ‘The Kaminsky Brigade’, in A. and J. Rabinowitch (eds.), Revolution and Politics in Russia. Essays in Honour of B. I. Nicolaevsky (Bloomington, Ind., 1972).
Elliot, M. R. , Pawns of Yalta (Urbana, Ill., 1982).
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Hoffmann, J. , Die Ostlegionen (Freiburg, 1976).
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