Scheldt Estuary, battle for, 85-day campaign, fought from September to November 1944, to open this vital Allied supply route up to the Belgian port of Antwerp.
Having swept across northern France during the last lap of the
Normandy campaign, tanks of
Montgomery's Twenty-First Army Group reached Antwerp on 4 September 1944. The Germans were so totally taken by surprise that they were prevented by local resistance groups from destroying the port's extensive dock installations and lock system. Captured intact these docks, and access to them via the River Scheldt, became the focal point for one of the critical battles of the European war. For without Antwerp to supply them (see
logistics), it would have been all but impossible for
Eisenhower's armies to start, much less finish, the
battle for Germany.
The capture of Antwerp left Lt-General Gustav-Adolph von Zangen's Fifteenth Army isolated on the west bank of the Scheldt. There was therefore little to oppose a thrust by
Dempsey's Second Army into the 112 km. (70 mi.) gap that yawned between von Zangen and the German forces defending the
West Wall. But Montgomery, concentrating on obtaining a bridgehead on the further side of the Rhine (see
MARKET-GARDEN), gave insufficient attention, and resources, to the problem of opening the Scheldt. Hitler's intention to stand at its banks was immediately revealed by
ULTRA intelligence. But this intelligence was ignored, its importance perhaps obscured by the euphoric feeling that total victory was not far off. It was ‘the first time that plain Ultra evidence on a matter of major importance had been disregarded’ ( R. Bennett,
Ultra in the West, London, 1979, p. 143); and so bitter was the first draft of the post-war official US military history about Montgomery's failure to react that Eisenhower felt obliged to suppress it.
The failure of MARKET-GARDEN crushed any hope of opening Rotterdam or Amsterdam as alternative supply ports. If Montgomery's forces had instead been used to cut the South Beveland isthmus, just 32 km. (20 mi.) north of Antwerp, they could have prevented the escape of the Fifteenth Army which was being ferried from Breskens to Flushing.
Crerar's First Canadian Army, which Montgomery thought would stop this exodus, was restricted by the diversion of supplies to those taking part in MARKET-GARDEN and by Montgomery's clear directive to clear the Channel ports first. Two of Crerar's armoured divisions did try to stop it but both failed to reach Breskens in time. On 20 September 1944, a Polish infantry brigade managed to reach Terneuzen, another port being used by the Germans, but an attack by it towards Breskens was soon halted. Bomber Command, too, failed to make much impact on the German evacuation, an operation of brilliant improvisation, for it was primarily committed to supporting Crerar's attacks on the Channel ports. However, from 17 September, it did start attacking the network of gun batteries and other defences sited on Walcheren Island which dominated the mouth of the Scheldt.
On 15 September Crerar's 1st Corps was committed to guarding the flank of the Second British Army during MARKET-GARDEN, so responsibility for clearing the banks of the Scheldt devolved on his 2nd Corps. His plans included a landing on Walcheren, once its dykes had been breached by Bomber Command and most of the inland German defences flooded or isolated, and the seizure of the area around Roosendaal and Bergen op Zoom before moving into South Beveland. On 26 September he returned to England for medical treatment and his place was taken by the commander of his 2nd Corps,
Lt-General Simonds.
In early October the 2nd Canadian Division started moving north from Antwerp towards the South Beveland isthmus. At the same time an operation (SWITCHBACK) was launched to eliminate the defensive area around Breskens, known to the Germans as Scheldt Fortress South and to the Allies as the
Breskens pocket. By 14 October this had been much reduced, but the supply situation was now so desperate that Montgomery was coming under increasing criticism for his failure to solve it. He finally issued an unequivocal directive on 16 October that enabled Simonds to concentrate the entire First Army on clearing both banks of the Scheldt. The 2nd Canadian Division launched an assault (VITALITY) along the isthmus to clear South Beveland and the eastern bank. Aided by two brigades from 52nd (Lowland) Division—which crossed the Scheldt on 26 October and landed on the coast—South Beveland was overrun by the end of the month. However, to reach Walcheren from the mainland a formidable obstacle, a 1,100 m. (1,200 yd.) causeway, dead straight and without any cover, had to be stormed. The Canadians attacked along it three times but were repulsed each time. They were eventually relieved by the two brigades of 52nd (Lowland) Division, units of which, in a daring operation, found a route across the Sloe channel on to the island. Meanwhile, the 3rd Canadian Division was steadily reducing the Breskens pocket. Breskens itself was taken on 21 October 1944, Knocke was captured on 2 November, and on 3 November patrols were reporting that Zeebrugge was clear. As this operation neared completion two amphibious assaults were launched against Walcheren by a British commando brigade with supporting armour: one at Westkapelle (INFATUATE I) on the westward tip of the island, the other at Flushing (IN FATUATE II).
Soon after dawn on 1 November the commandos used American
amphibians and
weasels to disembark through a breach in the dyke at Westkapelle. The defences facing them were formidable, for the heavy naval coastal batteries which dominated the estuary were protected by pillboxes, strong-points, concealed
flame-throwers, and anti-personnel mines. To help neutralize these defences, and in particular the three naval batteries in heavy concrete emplacements that commanded the estuary around Westkapelle, there was a preliminary bombardment by warships. But bad weather aborted the air bombardment and though rocket-firing aircraft were employed the 27 converted landing craft, specially equipped to pour concentrated fire on the beaches, were badly mauled. All but seven were sunk or damaged and there were 300 casualties, but they drew the fire of the batteries and the commandos landed comparatively unscathed.
At Flushing the commandos began landing before dawn after a heavy artillery bombardment on the port. They were closely followed by 155th Brigade of 52nd (Lowland) Division and two days of street fighting followed before the Germans there capitulated. Units of 155th Brigade then crossed the floods in amphibians to reach the island's capital, Middleburg, and the German commander surrendered there on 5 November. By then the commandos at Westkapelle had moved in both directions along the dyke and had captured all the batteries between Domburg and Flushing, enabling minesweeping operations in the River Scheldt to begin. There was residual resistance in the north of the island but by 8 November 1944 the last defenders had surrendered.
The Scheldt was declared free of mines on 26 November and two days later the first supply convoy arrived at the docks. Opening Antwerp brought about a complete revolution in the Allies' supply situation. Hitler realized full well how vital it was to them. Large numbers of the
V-weapons were directed at the city (more than at London);
E-boats and
midget submarines were deployed to interfere with the convoys; and it was the ultimate German objective when they launched their
Ardennes campaign. See also
amphibious warfare.
Bibliography
Moulton, J. , Battle for Antwerp (Shepperton, 1978).
Thompson, R. , The 85 Days (London, 1957).
Whitaker, W. and and S. , Battle of the Scheldt (London, 1985; published in Canada in 1984 as Tug of War).
