Rhine crossings

Rhine crossings. The River Rhine marked the last major natural obstacle barring the advance of the western Allies during the battle for Germany in 1945 (see Map 92). In spite of Montgomery's objections, Eisenhower planned to cross the river on a broad front, with Montgomery's Twenty-First Army Group in the north, Bradley's Twelfth Army Group in the centre, and Devers's Sixth Army Group in the south. Before this could be done, however, the approaches to the Rhine had to be cleared. This was the object of the Twenty-First Army Group operations VERITABLE and GRENADE and First US Army's Operation LUMBERJACK, all of which were launched in February. Further south, the Third and Seventh US Armies had yet to breach the West Wall.

First to arrive on the west bank of the river were elements of Simpson's Ninth US Army opposite Düsseldorf on 2 March, only to find the bridges blown. More success was enjoyed by Hodges's First US Army to Simpson's south. They stumbled across an intact bridge at Remagen five days later and their successful seizure of it brought about the dismissal of Rundstedt, German C-in-C West and his replacement by Kesselring. On 10 March Twenty-First Army Group had fully closed to the Rhine and Montgomery now began to prepare for a crossing at Wesel, north of the Ruhr. In the south, meanwhile, Patton's Third US Army and Patch's Seventh US Army continued to clear the area between the Moselle and the Rhine, while de Lattre de Tassigny's First French Army reduced the Colmar pocket.

While every effort was made to reinforce the Remagen bridgehead, the countryside east of the Rhine in this area was not conducive to break-out operations. In any event, to concentrate all his resources here was against Eisenhower's Broad Front policy (see OVERLORD), and he preferred to wait until other bridgeheads had been established. The first of these was achieved on the night of 22/23 March, when Patton, in a lightning move and assisted by deception measures elsewhere on the river, bounced a crossing at Oppenheim, south of Mainz, catching the defenders, a weakened Panzergrenadier division, totally by surprise. The following night, and in marked contrast in its elaborate planning and massive artillery support, came Montgomery's crossings at Emmerich, Rees, Wesel, and Rheinberg (PLUNDER). These were assisted by the dropping of one British and one US airborne division east of Wesel on the morning of 24 March (VARSITY), as well as an RAF Bomber Command attack on the town just before the crossing. During the following few days Third US Army made further crossings at Boppard and near St Goar (night of 24/25 March), both between Koblenz and Mainz; Seventh US Army crossed near Worms ( 26 March); and the French at Germersheim and Speyer, between Mannheim and Karlsruhe, on 31 March, and at Leumersheim on 2 April.

Thus, in the space of three weeks the western Allies had achieved a number of crossings over the Rhine on a front of no less than 320 km. (200 mi.). Eisenhower's Broad Front strategy had been maintained and the curtain was about to rise on the last act of the war against Germany. As for the crossings themselves, those at Remagen, Oppenheim, and by Twenty-First Army Group represent the three type of operational river crossing—opportunistic, hasty, and deliberate.

Charles Messenger

Bibliography

Ellis, L. , Victory in the West, Vol. 2 (London, 1968).
Weighley, R. , Eisenhower's Lieutenants: The Campaigns in France and Germany, 1944–45 (London, 1981).