Polish campaign

Polish campaign. The German invasion of Poland on 1 September 1939 marked the beginning of the Second World War in Europe (see Map 89). Each of the protagonists of the campaign had substantially differing aims. For Germany it was to overturn the Versailles settlement, destroy Poland, and satisfy territorial irredenta including Upper Silesia, the Polish corridor, and Danzig. With the exception of Danzig, none of these territories contained a German majority. For the USSR, Stalin's alliance with Hitler (see Nazi–Soviet Pact) was to ‘liberate’ Belorussian and Ukrainian peasants from ‘Polish landlords’ and to gain time and a territorial buffer against a potentially menacing Nazi Germany. For Poland, the aim was survival in what promised to be a long and costly war.

The immediate political crisis leading to the Polish campaign began in spring 1939 with the German absorption of what remained of Czechoslovakia. Following the occupation of Prague, France and the UK made a verbal Guarantee of Poland (see Poland, Guarantee of) and Hitler signed the Nazi–Soviet Pact which contained secret clauses for the fourth partition of Poland.

On the eve of the conflict, Germany (and the Soviet Union) enjoyed a significant preponderance of military strength over Poland. In the spring of 1939, the German armed forces mustered more than 100 active and reserve divisions and a cavalry brigade. The most important units of the Wehrmacht were the 5 panzer divisions (about 300 tanks each), the 4 light divisions (with substantially fewer tanks, these were scheduled to be converted into panzer divisions), and 4 motorized divisions (infantry divisions completely equipped with motor vehicles). The German infantry divisions were more numerous and well provided with artillery and supporting weaponry although they were almost exclusively dependent on horse transport (see animals). The total manpower of the German armed forces consisted of 2,500,000 trained men, active and reserve.

The Polish Army's peacetime strength in 1939 stood at about 280,000 men in 30 infantry divisions, 11 cavalry brigades, 2 mechanized brigades, and supporting specialist units. The peacetime army could draw on a large pool of nearly 3 million trained and partially trained reservists. Upon mobilization, reservists brought the standing units up to wartime strength and held the potential for fifteen reserve divisions. Some reservists without specific mobilization assignments served in a National Guard-type formation, the Obrona Narodowa.

The disparity in strength was even more evident when comparing German and Polish strength in air and naval forces. The Luftwaffe had more than 3,600 operational aircraft available on the eve of hostilities and deployed more than 1,500 of them: 897 bombers, 426 fighters, and numerous auxiliary types such as reconnaissance and transport in two Luftflotte. The Polish Air Force (Lotnictwo Wojskowe) in 1939 had in all approximately 1,900 aircraft and deployed more than 400 of them, including 154 bombers and 159 fighters. German aircraft of virtually all categories were more modern and technically advanced than the obsolescent machines used by the Poles. Only in some categories of bomber aircraft did the Polish Air Force have fully up-to-date equipment.

The German navy possessed an overwhelming superiority in the Baltic Sea. Available at the outbreak of hostilities were the modern battle-cruisers Scharnhorst and Gneisenau, 3 ‘pocket battleships’, 2 heavy cruisers, 6 light cruisers, 22 destroyers 43 submarines, and 2 obsolete pre-Dreadnought battleships used as training ships, the Schlesien and Schleswig-Holstein. The principal units of the Polish Navy consisted of just 4 modern destroyers and five modern submarines.

In terms of military doctrine, the Polish campaign provided the Wehrmacht with an opportunity to test the efficacy of the previously untried blitzkrieg technique. Although the Polish Army's tactical doctrine was also innovative, by emphasizing manoeuvre and economy of force, the material condition of Polish units made its application an ambitious prospect—Polish cavalry brigades, for instance, were only beginning the process of conversion into mechanized units.

German operational planning for the campaign crystallized in August 1939 under the codename FALL WEISS (Operation White). It envisaged the destruction of the Polish Army west of the Vistula–Narew–San river line by a concentric attack originating from Silesia in the south and Pomerania–East Prussia in the north. General von Bock commanded Army Group North with the Third Army under Lt-General Georg von Küchler composed of eight infantry divisions, a panzer brigade, and a cavalry brigade in East Prussia and Fourth Army under Kluge containing four infantry divisions, two motorized divisions, and a panzer division in Pomerania. Both armies had the task of pinching off the Polish corridor at its base. Third Army also had a central role in that it was to drive south towards Warsaw and cut off the line of retreat of Polish forces to the west.

Army Group South in Silesia contained the bulk of the German forces deployed in the Polish campaign. Under the command of General von Rundstedt, it comprised: Eighth Army under Blaskowitz, of five infantry divisions; Tenth Army under Reichenau of six infantry, two motorized infantry, two panzer, and three light divisions; and Fourteenth Army under List of five infantry, two panzer, and one light divisions. The objective of the Tenth Army's advance was Warsaw, with the Eighth and Fourteenth Armies providing protection on its flanks.

FALL WEISS committed the bulk of the German Army (over 60 divisions) to the Polish campaign, leaving only a screening force in the west. German plans rested on a speedy end to Polish resistance before the French Army could intervene.

Polish planning for a war with Germany began rather late. Although the Polish general staff made some initial studies in 1935, it was not until March 1939 that detailed work began on defence plan ‘West’, or ‘Plan Z’ as it would eventually be known. Polish planners correctly anticipated the directions from which the Wehrmacht would attack. Moreover, the Polish military understood that Poland could not conduct a war bereft of allies, but that help would not be immediately forthcoming.

With these assumptions in mind, the Polish general staff adopted a cordon defence in Plan Z that aimed to defend the western areas of the country. Although a plan predicated on a defensive position behind the Vistula–Narew–San river lines would have seemed more prudent, the western regions of Poland were the most populous and economically developed in the country. Political considerations therefore made it impossible to abandon them. Plan Z precluded a local German offensive to seize only the Polish corridor and Upper Silesia and signified Polish resolve to contest every bit of Polish territory, insuring against a repeat of the Anglo-French policy of appeasement of Germany typified by the Munich agreement.

Polish dispositions under Plan Z were strung out along the length of Polish frontier facing Germany and Slovakia. In the north facing east Prussia was the Narew Group consisting of two infantry divisions and one cavalry brigade commanded by Maj-General Czesław Młot-Fijałkowski. West of the Narew Group and also facing east Prussia was the Modlin Army under General Emil Przedrzymirski-Krukowicz with two infantry divisions and two cavalry brigades. Behind these two formations was a reserve force of three infantry divisions under General Stanisław Skwarczyński.

At the base of the Polish corridor stood General W. Bortnowski's Pomorze Army with five infantry divisions and one cavalry brigade. The Poznań Army, commanded by General Tadeusz Kutr zeba, was the next major formation to the south with four infantry divisions and two cavalry brigades. It stood in the Poznań salient and was supported by a reserve force of two infantry divisions. The Łódź Army occupied the central sector along the Polish–German frontier and consisted of four infantry divisions and two cavalry brigades under General Juliusz Rómmel. Facing Silesia was the Cracow Army with seven infantry divisions, a cavalry brigade, and a mechanized brigade led by General Antoni Szylling.

The Carpathian Army under General Kazimierz Fabrycy covered the southern border with two mountain brigades and was supported by the Tarnów reserve force of two infantry divisions. The general reserve of the Polish armed forces, the Prusy Army, situated just south of Warsaw, was commanded by General Stefan DaŖ-Biernacki. It contained eight infantry divisions, one cavalry brigade, and a tank brigade. A very weak screening force covered the long Polish–Soviet frontier.

The bombardment of the Polish garrison at Westerplatte by the German training ship, Schleswig-Holstein, anchored in Danzig harbour, signalled the opening of the German attack on Poland in the small hours of the morning on 1 September 1939. Air attacks were launched simultaneously, with military targets, such as airfields, roads, and railway lines, being heavily bombed. The Luftwaffe's weight in numbers gave it immediate air superiority, allowing it to range over the country.

The ground war moved quickly as the German Army broke through the Polish defences in the opening battles. The campaign proceeded in three phases: (1)the opening battles on the frontier,(2)the drive on Warsaw and the one Polish counter-attack, and(3)the elimination of pockets of Polish resistance.

In the north, the German Third and Fourth Armies effected a juncture, cutting the Polish corridor at the base by 3 September. These operations led to the destruction of the Pomorze Army and the withdrawal of the Modlin Army. From Silesia, German Army Group South made initial breakthroughs against the Łódź and Cracow Armies. By 5 September the Polish position was critical, with the British and French declarations of war against Germany offering little hope of relief.

Between 6 and 10 September the Third and Fourth Armies from the north and Army Group South pressed home their initial successes by driving on Warsaw. With their motorized and panzer divisions, the German Fourth Army in the north and the Tenth in the south played a crucial role in the advance and demonstrated the efficacy of the blitzkrieg.

The only serious Polish counter-attack was launched on 9 September by the retreating Poznań Army in a south east direction from the Bzura against the flank of the advancing German Eighth Army. In the three-day battle of Kutno the Poznań Army destroyed a German division before air attacks and reinforcements from the German Tenth Army checked the Polish attack. The speed of the advancing German armour and the disruption of communications by the Luftwaffe precluded plans for organizing a defence behind the Vistula–Narew–San line; and with the Polish command structure breaking down under the onslaught, the Polish C-in-C, Marshal Edward S˙migły-Rydz, found it impossible to communicate with, let alone direct, his increasingly isolated formations. By mid-September, the German forces from Army Groups North and South met near Brest-Litovsk completing a wide encirclement of Warsaw and the bulk of the Polish armed forces.

In the final phase of the September campaign, the collapse of Polish resistance was accelerated by the entry of the Red Army into eastern Poland on 17 September. What remained of any substantial organized Polish resistance was centred on Warsaw and the fortress of Modlin to the north of the city. After a resolute defence in the face of air and artillery bombardment, and continual pressure from the German Army, Warsaw capitulated on 27 September followed by the Modlin fortress a day later. The last vestige of organized resistance ended on 5 October.

The tally sheet of the September campaign reflects the success of the blitzkrieg doctrine. German casualties in the four-week campaign numbered under 50,000 with 8,082 killed, 27,278 wounded, and 5,029 missing. Polish losses were significantly higher, with an estimated 70,000 officers and men killed and about 130,000 wounded. Some 90,000 men escaped to Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, and Romania, many of whom made their way to the west.

The September campaign has engendered many myths about Polish ineptness and suicidal heroism. The often repeated stories that the Polish Air Force was destroyed on the ground in the opening hours of the war and that Polish cavalry charged tanks are cases in point. They owe more to historical fiction than to actual events on the battlefield. The Polish armed forces simply succumbed to a more numerous and better equipped foe employing a new and deadly military doctrine.

Paul Latawski

Bibliography

Kennedy, R. M. , The German Campaign in Poland ( 1939) (Washington, DC, 1956).
Biegański, W., Kozłowski, E., and Matusak, P. (eds.), The Policy and Strategy of Poland in the Second World War 1939–1945 (Warsaw, 1975).