North African campaign

North African campaign. This was fought after Anglo-American landings (TORCH) in French Morocco and Algeria on 8 November 1942 and culminated in the capitulation of German–Italian forces in Tunisia the following May (see Maps 75 and76).

The fall of France in June 1940 left the North African French colonies in the hands of Vichy French administrations pledged to defend them against all comers. Nevertheless, an early plan for British forces to occupy Tunisia and Algeria (GYMNAST) was based on the hope that the French there would co-operate with any Allied invasion. A later plan (SUPER-GYMNAST), which included American help, was dropped when the British and Commonwealth Eighth Army was forced out of Libya after the Gazala battle of June 1942, but was soon revived as a more realistic alternative to the immediate invasion of France. Though not the Second Front that Stalin so ardently sought, it had a greater chance of success, required fewer landing craft, and was considered a more suitable baptism of fire for unblooded US troops. It was hoped that the French in North Africa would side with the Allies and to facilitate this realignment General Giraud, a staunch opponent of Germany, was spirited away from Vichy France by submarine. But his codename, KING-PIN, proved inappropriate: at first he refused to co-operate and then he proved politically ineffectual.

TORCH was primarily an American operation and Lt-General Eisenhower was appointed C-in-C, Allied Expeditionary Force. His deputy was another American, Maj-General Mark Clark, as was the Western Air Commander (Twelfth USAAF) Brigadier-General James Doolittle (see also Doolittle raid); all his other commanders— Lt-General Kenneth Anderson, Admiral Cunningham, and the Eastern Air Commander, Air Marshal William Welsh (No. 333 Group RAF)—were British. With these officers Eisenhower set out to achieve a truly unified command. In marked contrast to the animosity that prevailed between the two Panzer Army commanders, Arnim and Rommel, who opposed the Allies in Tunisia, Eisenhower's Allied Forces Headquarters (AFHQ) ‘proceeded,’ as he put it, ‘as though all its members belonged to a single nation’.

Eisenhower's directive from the Combined Chiefs of Staff was to gain complete control of North Africa from the Atlantic to the Red Sea starting with landings in Algeria and French Morocco; after taking all of French North Africa, to strike eastwards and take Rommel's German–Italian Panzer Army in Libya in the rear; and to clear that country of all Axis forces.

In the hope of preventing hostilities with the French, Clark landed secretly near Algiers on 22 October 1942 to meet the pro-Giraud Maj-General Charles Mast, chief of staff of the 19th French Corps. Mast guaranteed that if he was given four days' notice neither the French Army nor the Air Force would resist the Allied landings with any enthusiasm, especially around Algiers, though he could not answer for the navy (which, in the event, resisted strongly).

Three landing places, Casablanca (Western Force, commanded by Maj-General Patton), Oran (Central Force, commanded by Maj-General Lloyd Fredendall), and Algiers (Eastern Force, commanded by Maj-General Charles Ryder), were eventually chosen, with Western Air Command supporting the two westerly landings and Eastern Air Command those around Algiers. The Western and Central land forces were all American and they later provided formations for 2nd US Corps which fought in Tunisia. As it was thought that the French were more likely to oppose British landings—the British bombardment of the French Navy at Mers-el-Kébir and the Syrian campaign had not been forgotten—the Eastern Force initially comprised only a US assault force which was to be reinforced later by British troops. These were then to combine to become, ‘by the wave of a wand’ as the British official historian of the campaign put it, First British Army, though it only had one corps until early 1943. Its task was to move into Tunisia as quickly as possible, Ryder having handed over to Anderson.

The total number of Allied troops involved in the landings was 65,000, a little more than half the strength of the French forces in North Africa. Some 650 warships were deployed to take and guard the Central and Eastern forces from the UK; Patton's force sailed direct from the USA. The landings, facilitated by good intelligence from Agency Africa, took place in the early hours of 8 November 1942 and excellent security achieved complete strategic surprise. The toughest opposition was met around Casablanca: landing in the surf proved hazardous and the resident-general, General Noguès, uncooperative. But Algiers was occupied the same day and Oran two days later—though 1,400 American and 700 French troops were killed in the process.

Initially the political situation was uncertain and complicated. Shortly before the landings took place, Robert Murphy, Roosevelt's personal representative in North Africa, had informed the C-in-C French Forces, North Africa, General Juin, that they were about to take place and had requested French co-operation. Juin was willing to co-operate but by chance the C-in-C of the Vichy French armed forces, Admiral Darlan, was in Algiers and Juin refused to act without his authority. Initially, Darlan refused to countenance French co-operation, but after a day of negotiations, and telegrams to and from Vichy, he ordered Juin to negotiate a cease-fire and US troops entered Algiers that evening. Units were then dispatched by sea and air to secure the ports of Bougie and Bône, and nearby airfields, to support the overland advance into Tunisia.

Negotiations continued with Darlan who, on 10 November 1942, agreed to order a general cease-fire which stopped all fighting in French Morocco and Algeria and saved Casablanca from being stormed. But the political consequences were far-reaching. The Vichy government broke off relations with the USA and accepted the offer of German air support, which resulted in the immediate German occupation of Tunisian airfields. To assuage German anger the Vichy government repudiated Darlan's cease-fire, and when Darlan tried to rescind it he was promptly arrested by the Americans. But the Vichy government's action failed to stop the Germans moving into unoccupied (Vichy) France; Corsica was occupied by the Italians; and Axis troops started pouring into Tunisia with the acquiescence of the French resident-general, Admiral Estéva.

The occupation of Vichy France released Darlan from his obligations to the Vichy government. After agreeing to co-operate with the Allies, he was appointed high commissioner for French North Africa by Eisenhower. Giraud, who had proved to be a non-starter politically for the Allies, became C-in-C French Forces, North Africa, with Juin under him. Doing a deal with such a notorious Vichyite as Darlan caused a furore, especially in London, but only he wielded the necessary influence to bring his countrymen on to the side of the Allies—though he failed to persuade the French Fleet at Toulon to join him and it subsequently scuttled itself (see French fleet, scuttling of). However, on 24 December 1942, he was assassinated by a French student and was replaced as high commissioner by Giraud, who also remained as C-in-C. By then the French, including Estéva's ground forces in Tunisia, were firmly in the Allies' fold.

By the end of November 1942 the Luftwaffe was harassing the advancing Allies with increasing effectiveness while 17,000 Axis troops had been airlifted or shipped into Tunisia. Initially these troops came under Lt-General Walther Nehring's 90th Corps HQ. When Arnim, who was closely directed by the German C-in-C South-West, Field Marshal Kesselring, arrived in December, 90th Corps became Fifth Panzer Army with 10th Panzer Division as its main striking force.

Arnim's task was to prevent the capture of Tunis; to stop the Allies reaching the central Tunisian coastline and thereby severing his forces from Rommel, who was then withdrawing into southern Tunisia; and to deepen his dangerously narrow bridgehead. Although Allied troops got within 20 km. (13 mi.) of Tunis, in the short term Arnim accomplished all three objectives. At the northern, coastal, end of the Allied line, Anderson's First Army—thwarted first by 10th Panzer Division's attacks around Tébourba; then by the rain and mud of a Tunisian winter and by inadequate air support; and lastly by the tenacious German defence of Longstop Hill which blocked the way to Tunis—could only wait for reinforcements and better weather. At the mountainous southern end it was drier, and in mid-January 1st US Armoured Division and part of 1st US Infantry Division (see Big Red One), commanded by Fredendall's 2nd US Corps HQ , gathered there to launch an attack towards the coast. But before this could be mounted Arnim launched his own offensive (EILBÖTE) on 18 January by attacking the poorly armed and equipped French divisions further north which were holding the Eastern Dorsale mountains south of Pont du Fahs.

Allied calculations that German tanks could not operate in this mountainous region soon proved erroneous and the French were thrown into disarray. On 24 January Anderson was given operational control of Allied troops, but by the end of the month all the Eastern Dorsale passes were in German hands and two weeks later the Germans started a new offensive. Arnim took Sidi Bou Zid and then Sbeitla, while some of Rommel's forces entered Gafsa unopposed as the Allies began withdrawing to the Western Dorsale mountains. This withdrawal was completed on 19 February 1943 but in one 48-hour period Fredendall lost two tank, two infantry, and two artillery battalions to Arnim's panzer divisions; and when Rommel struck at the Kasserine Pass, instead of further north as ULTRA intelligence had seemed to predict, Fredendall's forces cracked.

Fleetingly the two panzer armies now had the chance to outflank and destroy the Allied forces in northern Tunisia. But Rommel could no longer exercise the independence of command he had enjoyed during the Western Desert campaigns. Instead of attacking towards Tébessa, as he knew he should, the Italian High Command (see Comando Supremo) ordered him northwards towards Le Kef and Allied reinforcements—‘an appalling and unbelievable piece of shortsightedness’ as he later described it. It certainly failed to achieve anything and increasing Allied resistance, the unsuitable terrain for mobile operations, and Arnim's obstructiveness forced Rommel to abandon the offensive on 22 February 1943. The next day he was promoted C-in-C Army Group Africa and handed over command of his German–Italian Panzer Army, which was renamed First Italian Army, to General Messe. Then on 28 February ULTRA revealed his plans to use all three of his panzer divisions to attack Montgomery's Eighth Army which were approaching the Axis Mareth Line defences in southern Tunisia.

On 20 February, while the fighting at Kasserine was at its height, the decision made at the Casablanca conference the previous month (see SYMBOL), to form Eighteenth Army Group and a unified air command, was implemented. Air Chief Marshal Tedder became AOC-in-C Mediterranean Air Command and General Alexander was appointed Eisenhower's deputy and C-in-C of the new group which comprised both armies (First and Eighth) in Tunisia. Two days later the Allies were back at Kasserine, but much confidence had been lost, as well as men and matériel, and Fredendall was replaced in March by Patton. Alexander, who had as his directive the completion of the campaign by the end of April 1943, so that the Sicilian campaign landings could take place before August that year, found the command situation abysmal. He reported that British, American, and French units were all mixed up on the front, especially in the south, that there was no policy or plan of campaign and that, as a result, the Allies had lost the initiative.

The front was quickly reorganized. National sectors were created and the French divisions were re-equipped. Some ground was lost in the north when Arnim, trying to take advantage of the chaos caused at Kasserine, launched a new, and ill-conceived, offensive (OCHSENKOPF), but by 1 April it had all been retaken by the Allies. In southern Tunisia, the Eighth Army rebuffed Rommel at Medenine on 6 March and three days later Rommel, a sick man, flew to Germany and never returned.

Messe's forces defending the Mareth Line more or less matched Montgomery's in numbers, but the Eighth Army was far better equipped. It also had more tanks and was strongly supported by the Western Desert Air Force. Even so, Montgomery's frontal assault on the Mareth Line, begun on 19 March, failed. He then outflanked it inland but was unable to prevent Messe withdrawing to another position further north at Wadi Akarit. But with Patton's 2nd US Corps now threatening his flank and rear, Messe's position was critical—as, indeed, was the whole of Army Group Africa's. When one of Kesselring's staff officers commented to Arnim that the Army Group seemed always to be thinking of retreat, squinting over its shoulder, as he described it, Arnim replied bitterly that he was squinting for ships, for he was without food or ammunition, as Rommel's army had been before him. The consequences, he warned, were inevitable.

The inevitable soon occurred. The tourniquet applied by the naval blockade and by the Allied air forces to the Axis forces in Tunisia was now so tight that few supplies or reinforcements were reaching them. On land, an attempt by 2nd US Corps to reach the coast failed, but Montgomery broke through at Wadi Akarit and forced Messe into another withdrawal. Slowly, the Axis began to be pressed into a pocket around Tunis: one of First Army's corps began clearing the hilly country north of the Beja–Medjez el Bab road, while 2nd US Corps, now commanded by Lt-General Bradley, moved to the northern flank to attack towards Bizerta. These preliminaries accomplished, Alexander launched an all-out offensive (VULCAN) on 22 April 1943. The First Army attacked towards Tunis to envelop Arnim's main force blocking the Medjez–Tunis road; Bradley struck at Bizerta and 19th French Corps advanced towards Pont du Fahs; but Montgomery failed to break through Messe's new positions at Enfidaville, and he remained on the defensive. When VULCAN appeared to be flagging Alexander took Montgomery's advice—and two of his best divisions—to help mount a final assault (STRIKE) by First Army's 9th Corps along the Medjez–Tunis road. Aided by massive artillery and air support this succeeded and Arnim's defences collapsed, with Tunis, Bizerta, and Pont du Fahs all falling in one day. The two German panzer armies now disintegrated into isolated pools of resistance which were mopped up one by one, the last surrendering on 13 May. The Allies, who had 76,000 casualties during the campaign, took more than 238,000 prisoners-of-war.

It was argued at the time, especially by the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, and has been argued by some since, that the North African campaign sidetracked the Allies from their primary task of defeating the Germans by invading France. But given the shaky performance of the Allied command system, and of some troops, it is hard to see how such an undertaking could have been successfully achieved in 1942 or 1943. As it was, US troops under Patton showed their true mettle in the Sicilian campaign, and the experiences gained from the TORCH landings were put to good use both there and when the Allies landed in Normandy in June 1944 (see OVERLORD). See also Grand Alliance and land power.

Bibliography

Jackson, W. , The Battle for North Africa (London, 1975).
Macmillan, H. , War Diaries (London, 1984).
Sainsbury, K. , The North African Landings, 1942 (London, 1976).