Nazi–Soviet Pact. As commonly encountered in western history books, this is a somewhat imprecise label that is used to refer both to the German–Soviet Treaty of Non-Aggression of 23 August 1939 and to the broader political settlement between Germany and the USSR which followed it. In the narrow sense, it includes not only the public clauses of the Non-Aggression Treaty, but also the secret protocols which accompanied them. More broadly, it may also be taken to cover the German–Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation, and Demarcation of 28 September 1939, which modified the earlier agreement and which governed German–Soviet relations until 22 June 1941 when the German invasion of the USSR was launched (see
BARBAROSSA). Taken together, these agreements between Europe's two leading military powers set the framework within which the events of the first two years of the Second World War took place.
Many misunderstandings about the Nazi–Soviet Pact have arisen as the result both of the policy of the western powers at the time, and of subsequent Soviet
historiography. In 1939–41, the western powers, which declared war on Germany and Italy, were careful to avoid conflict with the USSR. They were banking on the possibility—which later materialized—that Hitler and Stalin would eventually fall out and that a Western coalition with Moscow against Germany could re-emerge (as during the
First World War). Because of this, many western historians were led to talk of Stalin's ‘neutrality’ during the Nazi–Soviet Pact. This however, is a very partial point of view, which is arguable even in relation to Stalin's attitude towards the West, and is entirely inaccurate regarding Soviet military activities in eastern Europe (see
Polish campaign,
Finnish–Soviet war,
Baltic States,
Bessarabia, and
Bukovina). For their part, until as late as 1990 Soviet historians were reluctant to admit to the genuine character of the secret protocols. The existence of the second German–Soviet treaty, of 28 September 1939, was simply ignored.
A Nazi–Soviet rapprochement was in the making from May 1939. Stalin had never completely closed the German option. But when
Molotov surfaced as commissar for foreign affairs in place of
Litvinov, the advocate of collective security with the West, a more energetic approach was being prepared. Direct negotiations began in June under cover of ‘trade talks’, and were pursued in parallel to the much more leisurely discussions about a possible Anglo-Soviet defence arrangement. By the time that
Ribbentrop, Hitler's foreign minister, flew to Moscow in August, preparations were well advanced.
Both Hitler and Stalin harboured fundamental objections to the
Versailles settlement as imposed by the western powers after 1918. Among other things, both harboured resentments against the independent Poland, which lay between them. Hitler had long ago decided to attack Poland, but could not afford to do so if he would thereby offend Stalin's own ambitions.
The Pact solved not only the immediate Polish conundrum, but also the wider issue of German and Soviet revisionist aims. The essence of the deal was to create two distinct spheres of influence within which each side would be free to operate without fear of interference from the other. Once Poland had been destroyed by joint action, Hitler would be free to attack his neighbours to the west, whilst Stalin would be free to do the same in the east. In this context, the concept of ‘non-aggression’ was given an especially gangsterish interpretation. The Nazis and Soviets agreed to refrain from aggression against each other, in the full expectation that they could both commit aggression with impunity in other directions.
The main text of the German–Soviet Treaty of 23 August 1939, therefore, can only be fully understood in conjunction with the accompanying protocols, which remained secret until the capture of the Nazi archives in 1945. After discussing ‘their respective spheres of influence in eastern Europe’, the plenipotentiaries decided for the time being on an ‘approximate’ line along the rivers Vistula, Narew, and San. The Soviets staked out their claim to the larger part of Poland, to Bessarabia, Estonia, and Latvia, though not at this stage Lithuania. The protocols were to be kept secret. A further ‘friendly agreement’ was envisaged ‘in the course of further political developments’. The expected assault on Poland, for which the Pact was the political starting signal, was not explicitly mentioned (see R. J. Sonntag and J. S. Beddie,
Nazi-Soviet Relations: Documents from the Archives of the German Foreign Office, Washington, DC, 1948, pp. 78 ff.).
Towards the end of the Polish campaign, on 28 September, the German–Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation, and Demarcation made important extensions and amendments to the treaty of 23 August. German–Soviet relations were raised to the active plane, especially in the realms of security and propaganda. The Soviets surrendered their claim to a large slice of Poland between the Vistula and Bug in return for Lithuania. Provision was made for joint action against ‘Polish agitation’ (see
Katyń).
Much remains to be discovered about the Nazi–Soviet Pact, especially in relation to Soviet policy. Just before the collapse of the USSR in 1991, Soviet historians exploded the myth that Stalin entered the Pact in order to gain time for strengthening the Red Army's defences: the Red Army never adopted systematic defensive positions, even in 1941. Nothing is known for certain of his calculations concerning the likely outcome of Hitler's attack on western Europe, nor of Stalin's intentions in the longer term, once Germany and the Soviet Union had achieved their immediate objectives. If the Soviet military had shared the predictions of the western experts, with whom they held lengthy talks in 1939, it is reasonable to suppose that they would have been expecting an Allied–German conflict on the Western Front to last for three or four years (as in 1914–18). In which case, it may also be within the realm of possibility, as one ex-Soviet officer has suggested, that Stalin was biding his time, to launch a European offensive of his own (see V. Suvorov,
Icebreaker: Who started the Second World War?, London, 1990). The collapse of the USSR, and the prospect of access to Soviet archives, may finally throw light on these questions, which are vital to any full analysis of the outbreak of war, but which have remained unanswered for more than 50 years.
Norman Davies
