Moscow, battle for

Moscow, battle for. The core of the Russian heartland, the Soviet capital was the centre of the most highly developed industrial complex and of the national railway network, and was the Germans' single most important military objective when they invaded the USSR in June 1941 (see BARBAROSSA). The German General Staff believed Stalin would sacrifice his last manpower and matériel reserves to defend it and the surrounding region. Hitler gave higher priority to other objectives, belatedly shifted the main effort towards Moscow, by launching Operation TYPHOON on 2 October 1941, and thereby set the stage for the first and one of the most serious German defeats on land in the Second World War.

On 10 October 1941, Stalin appointed General Zhukov to command West front (army group), eight armies on a 280 km. (174 mi.) north–south line centered on Mozhaisk, 100 km. (62 mi.) west of Moscow. Opposite Zhukov, Bock's Army Group Centre had, from north to south, Ninth Army, Third Panzer Group, Fourth Panzer Group, Fourth Army, Second Panzer Army, and Second Army. As Soviet armies had smaller establishments than German armies, the forces were numerically about equal, roughly a million men each.

The speed of Bock's advance after the launching of TYPHOON had already aroused apprehension on the Soviet side, and when Zhukov lost his northern anchor, Kalinin, on 14 October and Mozhaisk four days later, panic broke out in Moscow and signs of disintegration appeared in the armies. On 19 October, the city went under martial law and the government offices and diplomatic corps began evacuating to Kuibyshev. But the autumn rains, which turned the unpaved Russian roads into rivers of viscous mud, then began to bring the German advance to a three-week halt. Nevertheless, the Germans spent little effort bombing Moscow, preferring to use the Luftwaffe against Soviet ground forces. According to Soviet sources (which credited Moscow's air defence system for such small numbers), only 229 German aircraft appeared over the capital during the first six months of the war.

During the hiatus, Zhukov restored discipline at the front, and Stalin set about mustering nine reserve armies behind the River Volga. The armies, about 100,000 men each, had to be filled with raw troops, many over-age, under-age, or unfit, but seasoned Siberian divisions were also coming in to act as stiffening. German confidence waned. Wide, deep thrusts past Moscow that would engulf West front and possibly end the war before winter could hardly be contemplated. On the other hand, if the city alone were to be surrounded, appearances—and the psychological upper hand—would be preserved. The risk would still be great but, Bock decided, justified by the alternative, which was to sit out the winter 65 km. (40 mi.) or so from Moscow at the end of a single railway line while Zhukov had half a dozen at his disposal.

When TYPHOON resumed, on 15 November, the conditions were better than they had yet been. The ground was frozen solidly enough to support tanks; the summer's dust and insects were gone; and the lowland forests and swamps were giving way to open terrain. A whole Soviet army opposite Ninth Army collapsed on the first day. On 27 November, Third Panzer Group reached the Moscow–Volga Canal 60 km. (37 mi.) north of the city; on its right, Fourth Panzer Group had a division 20 km. (12.5 mi.) outside the suburbs; and Second Panzer Army had pushed past Tula to Kashira, on the river Oka 100 km. (62 mi.) south-east of Moscow. Stalin apparently considered the situation too precarious to be worth his expending reserves other than odds and ends, and culls from Moscow jails. But Bock was in even deeper trouble: he had no reserves, and the Fourth Army, which was to have formed the western arc of the encirclement, was stalled and acting like a leash holding back both armoured spearheads.

For a week, without making significant gains, the armoured elements kept a tenuous hold on the one advantage they still had, the initiative. On the night of 4 December, after a heavy snowfall, the temperature dropped to ç34 °C (ç29 °F), immobilizing much of the German equipment and penetrating the troops' ordinary winter dress: Hitler had expected to have withdrawn two-thirds of the troops and vehicles before the severe cold arrived and the winter gear and supplies for the other third had been stored in Poland to avoid clogging the supply lines while the offensive was in progress. On 5 December, Zhukov ordered a counter-attack to begin along the whole front the next day. That night the temperature fell to ç40 °C (ç40 °F) and in the morning gaps in the German line, which had formerly been covered by mobile patrols, became avenues for the Soviet advance.

Armies from Stalin's reserve rapidly transformed the counter-attack into a counter-offensive. German units trying to engage the Soviet elements behind and between them had to abandon numerous tanks, trucks, and artillery pieces immobilized by the cold. Blizzards blocked the roads and brought down telephone lines. Rear echelon troops retreating westward in full flight were congesting the few open roads. The chief of the German General Staff, General Halder, pronounced it the ‘greatest crisis in two world wars’.

On 16 December, the German salients north of Moscow and north-east of Tula having been eliminated, Zhukov put the counter -offensive into its second phase, a frontal push westwards. On 18 December, Bock requested sick leave, and the German Army's C-in-C, Field Marshal von Brauchitsch, offered his resignation. Hitler appointed Field Marshal von Kluge to replace Bock and named himself Commander-in-Chief. He then issued an order to all commands demanding ‘fanatical resistance’ and prohibiting retreats for any reason. Officers who disobeyed were subject to dismissal or worse. Among the first to go was the Second Panzer Army commander, General Guderian, until then one of Hitler's favourites.

By 7 January 1942, Zhukov had pushed the German front back to the line from which TYPHOON had resumed in November. He believed he could go the whole way to its starting line east of Smolensk before the winter ended, but Stalin, seeking a grand encirclement of Army Group Centre, ordered the effort shifted to the flanks. The scope of that venture overtaxed Soviet operational skill, and in the ensuing mêlée, the German commands gradually recovered their equilibrium. When the spring thaw terminated the fighting—and the Soviet initiative—the front was a ragged line, but Army Group Centre still held a solid segment 150 km. (93 mi.) west of Moscow.

Earl Ziemke

Bibliography

Seaton, A. , The Battle for Moscow (London, 1971).
Zhukov, G. K. , Memoirs of Marshal Zhukov (London, 1971).
Ziemke, E. F. , Moscow to Stalingrad (Washington, DC, 1968).