Mers-el-Kébir

Mers-el-Kébir, Algerian port where the French fleet was at anchor when on 3 July 1940 it was bombarded by the Royal Navy.

When the armistice between France and Germany was signed on 25 June 1940, the fate of the powerful French fleet, the fourth largest in the world, was of critical importance to the British. Most of its main units were scattered among various Mediterranean ports, though some were in British ones and a few were in the French West Indies. The warships at the Mers-el-Kébir naval base included the modern battle-cruisers Dunkerque and Strasbourg (both superior to any German battle-cruiser), two older battleships, and six large destroyers, while seven destroyers and four submarines were at nearby Oran.

The terms of the armistice stipulated that the French fleet would not be used by the Germans or Italians, but would be immobilized under their control, and the Vichy French navy minister, Admiral Darlan, had instructed his captains that under no circumstances were their ships to fall into German hands (see French fleet, scuttling of). The full text of this message was not available to the British who, in any case, were concerned about the ultimate fate of these powerful vessels. It was therefore decided that the French fleet must be put permanently out of Hitler's reach, and that the vacuum created by its absence in the Mediterranean should be filled by creating Force H under Admiral Somerville.

As a first move all French ships in British ports were seized on 3 July 1940. The same day Force H was dispatched to Mers-el-Kébir where Somerville opened negotiations with Admiral Marcel Gensoul who commanded the French naval forces there. Initially, Gensoul refused to see Somerville's emissary and the negotiations were conducted in writing. The French admiral was given four options:1.put to sea and join forces with the Royal Navy;2.sail with reduced crews to any British port where the ships would be impounded and the crews repatriated;3.sail with reduced crews to a French port in the West Indies where the ships would be immobilized;4.scuttle his ships within six hours.

The Admiralty also instructed Somerville that should Gensoul refuse all these offers it would allow the ships to be immobilized in their present berths. Given the conditions laid down by the Admiralty, this was an impracticable proposition and so was never mentioned to Gensoul. He was told that if he refused to agree to any of the terms his ships were to be sunk. Gensoul reported the negotiations to the French Admiralty by signalling only that he had been told to scuttle his ships within six hours or force would be used. As a consequence, and not surprisingly, Gensoul was given full authority to resist.

When Gensoul at last agreed to meet an emissary, Somerville, who was profoundly unhappy about using force, delayed taking any action for as long as possible. But while the emissary was still aboard Gensoul's flagship, Dunkerque, the French Admiralty sent aplain-language signal ordering all French naval forces in the Mediterranean to move to Oran and to put themselves at Gensoul's disposal. This message was intercepted by the Admiralty which ordered Somerville to proceed quickly before he had to deal with reinforcements as well as with the forces before him.

Somerville's emissary left Dunkerque at 1725 having already informed Somerville that Gensoul still refused to comply exactly with any of the four options, and at 1754 Somerville opened fire. The battleship Bretagne blew up, several other ships were seriously damaged, and 1,297 lives were lost. Dunkerque was only slightly damaged, but was crippled by torpedo aircraft during a second attack on 6 July. Strasbourg and six other ships escaped, as did some cruisers stationed at Algiers.

Two days after the bombardment the French battleship Richelieu, at Dakar, was attacked by torpedo aircraft from the carrier Hermes and damaged, but at Alexandria the British C-in-C Mediterranean, Admiral Cunningham, persuaded the French admiral to disarm his ships, thus avoiding more bloodshed.

Mers-el-Kébir created great tension between the French and the British. The Vichy government broke off diplomatic relations and French torpedo bombers made a retaliatory raid on Gibraltar. But it clearly showed the world in general, and the Americans in particular, that though apparently on the brink of defeat the British would stop at nothing to win the battle for the Mediterranean and to achieve eventual victory. See also sea power.

Bibliography

Marder, A. , From the Dardanelles to Oran: Studies of the Royal Navy in War and Peace, 1915–1940 (Oxford, 1974).