Marshall, General of the Army George C. (1880–1959),US Army chief of staff from 1939 to 1945, a member of the
Combined Chiefs of Staff committee throughout the war, and one of the Allies' most outstanding military leaders.
A graduate of the Virginia Military Institute, Marshall was chief of operations for 1st US Infantry Division in France during the
First World War. In 1918 his co-ordination of the movement over three roads of 600,000 men and 2,700 field guns in less than two weeks, earned him high praise and the position of General John Pershing's chief aide between 1919 and 1924.
Between the wars Marshall served in China with
Stilwell and at the Infantry School, Fort Benning, where future generals such as
Bradley,
Collins, and
Bedell Smith, were either instructors or students. Promotion was slow—he remained a lt-colonel for eleven years—but in 1936 he was promoted brig-general and in 1938 became chief of the War Plans Division. A few months later he was promoted to deputy chief of staff. During this time his proverbial candour came to the fore at a White House meeting. Roosevelt, while summing up his conclusions, turned casually to Marshall, whom he hardly knew, and said: ‘Don't you think so, George?’ Marshall replied: ‘I am sorry, Mr President, but I don't agree with that at all.’ Roosevelt never called Marshall by his Christian name again. Soon afterwards, on the recommendation of his closest adviser,
Harry Hopkins, and of Pershing, he promoted him chief of staff. It proved to be one of Roosevelt's most inspired appointments.
The two men came to trust and respect one another, but their temperaments and work habits were too dissimilar for complete rapport. Marshall worked well with his immediate civilian superior,
Henry Stimson, the secretary for war, and managed a working relationship with the chief of naval operations,
Admiral King, despite the fierce inter-service
rivalries that existed.
Marshall acted as chief of staff for two months before taking up the post on a permanent basis on 1 September 1939 and during this time he started his monumental task of increasing the army's strength, restructuring it, and equipping it for modern warfare, an undertaking for which, with the USA still neutral, he was often denigrated and which he pushed through relentlessly despite the opposition of many including the president. He was his own best liaison man with Congress and with the press, and it was his persuasiveness which resulted in Congressmen agreeing to conscription and then to its extension (see
selective service system). This enabled him to build the army's strength to 1.8 million by December 1941 and by the time the war ended to 8.25 million. In terms of divisions (90) this proved only just sufficient and he has been criticized for running it so close.
Marshall never seriously wavered from his conviction that Germany must be defeated first (see
Rainbow Plans) and he was the chief advocate of an early cross-Channel invasion, which caused some quite serious misunderstandings with the British (see
Grand Alliance). He was fiercely opposed to the
North African campaign, correctly supposing that intervention in the
battle for the Mediterranean would not end there and would result in a full-scale invasion of the Continent being delayed. When the British refused to launch an invasion in 1942, despite apparently agreeing to do so earlier in the year, Marshall threatened to shift US resources to the
Pacific war, a bluff which Roosevelt quickly called. At first it was assumed that Marshall would command the Allied forces invading north-west Europe (see
OVERLORD)—indeed Roosevelt had insisted he did—but when the moment of decision came the president wavered. He left the decision to Marshall, who declined to make it; then Roosevelt said he could not sleep well at night with Marshall out of Washington, and appointed
Eisenhower instead.
Marshall was promoted five-star general in December 1944, and in November 1945 requested retirement. However, he was soon recalled to civilian duty, became
President Truman's special representative in China, and then agreed to succeed
James Byrnes as secretary of state. He served in that post from 1947 to 1949, inaugurating during that time his famous Marshall Plan (see
consequences of the war) and in 1950 served as secretary of defence until he retired the following year. In 1953 he was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize.
Marshall was an aloof man, whose mere presence inspired confidence. His soft voice covered a sharp temper that could boil over or become icily disdainful. The aura of command that surrounded him was unmistakable but the principle of open discussion regardless of rank was rigorously maintained and encouraged by him. With the promotion and retirement of officers he was totally ruthless. He was not infallible in picking the right men—Fredendall (see
Kasserine Pass), Dawley (see
Salerno), and Millikin (see
Remagen bridge) were all his choice as corps commanders who had later to be relieved of their commands—but when asked who the army's leaders were going to be he produced a list of those known to him personally or recommended to him by officers he trusted. Besides Bradley, Collins, and Eisenhower, it included
Devers,
Hodges,
Patton,
Eichelberger,
Patch,
Simpson,
Clark, and
Truscott.
Marshall himself thought that his most important contribution to the war was to stand up to Churchill, for it was sometimes left to him to dispose of the prime minister's latest pet project. But Churchill never took this personally and once, after he had dined with Marshall, he turned to his personal physician and said: ‘That is the noblest Roman of them all.’ When Marshall retired Truman read a citation which said that while millions of Americans had given their country outstanding service, General of the Army George Marshall had given it victory.
Bibliography
Larrabee, E. , Commander in Chief: Franklin D. Roosevelt, His Lieutenants and Their War (New York, 1987).
Pogue, F. , George C. Marshall: Organizer of Victory (New York, 1973).
