Guadalcanal campaign

Guadalcanal campaign (see Map 47). This was, following the first Philippines campaign, the first real test of land strength between Japan and the USA in the Pacific war. The bloody and protracted struggle for this steamy, malaria-ridden, rain-sodden Solomon Island began on 7 August 1942.

The operation came under the overall command of Vice-Admiral Ghormley (1883–1958), C-in-C South Pacific Area, and was commanded tactically by Vice-Admiral Fletcher. US naval victories in the Coral Sea and at Midway had given the Americans the opportunity to mount the campaign, its purpose being to prevent a further Japanese advance southwards which would have severed the lines of communication between Australia and the USA.

Three fleet carriers and a powerful escort of warships protected Rear-Admiral Turner's amphibious force as it landed 19,000 men of the reinforced 1st Marine Division commanded by Maj-General Alexander Vandegrift (1887–1973). Except on the twin islets of Gavutu-Tananbogo, two of seven nearby islands also being oc cupied (see Tulagi), the marines met little opposition. But the landings were hurriedly conceived and executed to pre-empt a Japanese occupation, and to capture a partially-built Japanese airfield before it became operational. They flouted basic amphibious warfare doctrine by failing to secure lines of communication and isolate the landings from Japanese attack. Additionally, little was known either about the British-owned island—available maps of the area proved hopelessly inaccurate—or the Japanese order of battle.

Japanese reaction to the landings was swift. Aircraft and a strong naval force under Vice-Admiral Mikawa Gunichi were immediately dispatched from Rabaul. An early warning by a Coast Watcher of the bombers' approach prevented much damage, but before dawn on 9 August Mikawa surprised and defeated an Allied screening force off Savo Island. The landings then under way remained unscathed, but when Fletcher, who felt vulnerable to air attack, withdrew his carriers the next day the partially unloaded transports were forced to leave too. This left the marines without vital reserves and essential supplies, and until the nucleus of the Cactus Air Force arrived on 20 August they remained virtually isolated and highly vulnerable.

The Savo island battle gave the Japanese superiority at sea and they immediately began to land troops of their Seventeenth Army to wrest Guadalcanal from the marines. But throughout the campaign their commander, Lt-General Hyakutake Haruyoshi, not only repeatedly committed his men piecemeal—an error he could sometimes not avoid as they were brought from all over Japan's Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere at different times —but greatly underestimated the marines' strength. So it was symptomatic of his tactics and approach that, on 18 August, only part of the Ichiki Detachment was used to attack the marines' defensive perimeter around the airfield; and in what became known as the battle of Tenaru River—it was really the River Ilu—the whole Japanese force, some 900 men, was wiped out.

In the following months many more desperate land actions were fought to defend the airstrip (Henderson Field) but gradually the marines widened their perimeter as other units, which included 2nd Marine Division, reinforced them. But initially they only received Seabees to keep the airfield operational while the Japanese used the ‘Tokyo Express’ to pour in infantry and supplies, though Cactus Air Force patrols soon forced it to operate only at night.

The Table shows how both sides built up their forces on the island, the dates being some of the most critical of the campaign.

In their efforts to reinforce and support their men ashore both sides fought several critical naval actions and the struggle for supremacy on land was contingent on the outcome of the one being fought at sea. In the Eastern Solomons battle on 24 August the Japanese won a tactical victory, though the Americans delayed the landing of the Kawaguchi Brigade and the balance of the Ichiki Detachment. Six days later the fleet carrier Saratoga was torpedoed and so badly damaged that she had to return to the USA. Then on 15 September submarines sank another carrier, Wasp, and badly damaged the new battleship North Carolina; and though in the battle of Cape Esperance, fought on the night of 11/12 October, the Americans partially avenged these losses, it seemed that command of the sea was slipping from them. However, on 18 October 1942 Ghormley was replaced by the more aggressive Vice-Admiral Halsey and from that time the US Navy—although it suffered several more tactical reverses, which included the battles of Santa Cruz and Tassafaronga—slowly gained the upper hand.

Guadalcanal: Build-up of Japanese and American forces during the campaign to take Guadalcanal

	Japanese	American
Source: Contributor.
7 August	2,200	10,000
20 August	3,700	10,000
11 September	9,000	11,000
12– 20 October	22,000	23,000
12 November	30,000	29,000
1 December	25,000	40,000

Both the balance of the Ichiki Detachment and the 3,000-strong Kawaguchi Brigade were eventually landed at night well to the east of the marines' beachhead, and on 12 September another concerted effort was made to break through the American lines. But the three-pronged attack failed, though in the main action known as the battle of Bloody Ridge (or Edson's Ridge), fought against a Raider battalion, some Japanese came within 900 m. (1,000 yds.) of the airfield.

In early October the Sendai Division landed around the mouth of the River Matanikau to the west of the airstrip and this, and the bombardment by battleships of the Japanese Combined Fleet which almost obliterated Henderson Field and its aircraft, heralded a third major Japanese offensive. But when it started, on 23 October, it was badly co-ordinated and the marine garrison, recently reinforced by 3,000 men of the Americal Division, repulsed it.

In mid-November a final effort was made to swing the land battle in Hyakutake's favour by dispatching, under heavy naval escort, the veteran 38th Division in eleven transports, an operation which resulted in a three-day sea action known as the battle of Guadalcanal. The first clash, on the night of 12/13 November, lasted just 24 minutes and was one of the fiercest ever fought. The Americans lost six ships and the Japanese three, including one battleship. This prevented another bombardment of Henderson Field by the Japanese battleships, but that night their cruisers shelled it heavily. Nevertheless, the Cactus Air Force was still operational the next morning and this wrought havoc amongst the Japanese landing fleet. One cruiser was sunk and three others damaged before the marine pilots turned on the transports sinking seven. That night there was another clash at sea. The Japanese lost another battleship and one destroyer while the Americans lost three destroyers with one battleship badly damaged. The four remaining transports were beached to get their troops ashore, but were bombed and destroyed the next morning.

This naval battle proved to be the climax of the struggle for the island. The Japanese continued to send supplies and reinforcements, and to bombard Henderson Field, but at the beginning of 1943 mounting American superiority forced them to form a new defensive line on islands further north. From that time the dwindling Japanese forces on the island received only essential supplies by submarine (see also blockade runners), and the ‘Tokyo Express’ was almost abandoned.

During December 1942 the 1st Marine Division was relieved by the 25th US Infantry Division and Maj-General Patch, commanding the 14th US Corps, replaced Vandegrift. By early January, with his corps now totalling about 50,000 men, Patch went on to the offensive. The Japanese, cut off from supplies or reinforcements, continued to fight bravely. But at the end of January the survivors were ordered to withdraw to Cape Esperance where, in a brilliantly executed operation the Americans knew nothing about, some 13,000 men, including Hyakutake, were ferried in barges at night to waiting destroyers.

Seven major naval battles, with the determination of the Cactus Air Force pilots in the air and the marines ashore, combined to bring eventual victory for the Americans. The cost had been heavy—6,111 US army and marine casualties, including 1,752 killed, and substantial naval losses—but Guadalcanal is now seen as a major turning-point in the Pacific war from which Japan never recovered.

Bibliography

Coggins, J. , The Campaign for Guadalcanal (New York, 1972).
Tregaskis, R. , Guadalcanal Diary (New York, 1962).