Combined Operations, British nomenclature for
amphibious warfare and the first British organization to have an inter-service headquarters.
Though attacks from the sea had been mounted by the British for centuries they had no establishment which specialized in amphibious warfare until the Inter-Services Training and Development Centre (ISTDC) was opened in May 1938. This began examining the problems inherent in landing on a defended beach and prototypes of
landing craft were built which proved their worth during the
Norwegian campaign and at
Dunkirk.
In June 1940 Churchill called for a policy of raiding occupied territory and the adjutant-general of the Royal Marines, Lt-General Alan Bourne, was appointed ‘Commander of Raiding Operations on coasts in enemy occupation, and Adviser to the
Chiefs of Staff (COS) on Combined Operations’. ISTDC and six independent companies of commandos which had been raised for the Norwegian campaign were put under his command, but in July Churchill decided to replace him with
Keyes, a 68-year-old admiral of the fleet.
Keyes, whose title was ‘Director of Combined Operations’, immediately declared his independence by removing his staff from the Admiralty and setting up Combined Operations Headquarters (COHQ) in Richmond Terrace in central London. He founded the Combined Training Centre at Inverarary (others were later established in Egypt and India), saw to it that more landing craft were built, and was the driving force behind the expansion and training of the commandos. But he did not co-operate easily; he wanted COHQ to be an operational headquarters, not limited, as the COS required, to the study of the inter-service problems which amphibious warfare posed and the development of suitable landing craft and technical aids. In October 1941, after a new COS directive changed his title from ‘Director’ to ‘Adviser’ he stepped down and Churchill replaced him with
Mountbatten who was promoted to commodore.
Mountbatten was vigorous, young, and brimful of charm. ‘Handsome and breezy, like Brighton at its best,’ as one observer has described him. He also possessed great tact, not Keyes's forte. Churchill, whose protégé he was, ordered him to start a raiding programme, but told him that his main objective was to plan the return of Allied forces to occupied France, that his HQ was being created to be on the offensive, and that he was to give no thought for the defensive.
Initially only an ‘adviser’, by January 1942 Mountbatten had become the ‘mounting authority’ for all raids, though they had to be approved in outline by the COS. During the first half of 1942 a number were mounted, including
Bruneval and
St Nazaire, and several were undertaken by the
Small Scale Raiding Force.
In March 1942 Mountbatten was promoted to vice-admiral. He had also the equivalent rank in the two other services, and a new title, Chief of Combined Operations (CCO). He now sat with the COS as a full member whenever major questions were under discussion whereas previously he had had the right to attend only when matters within his directive were under review.
Soon after his elevation to CCO, Mountbatten had nine US officers, including
Brigadier-General Truscott, seconded to COHQ, thus making it the first international inter-service headquarters of the war. Another decision was to dismember the ISTDC. One part now came under COHQ's newly appointed Director of Experiments and Developments (later Director of Experiments and Operational Requirements, or DXOR). The other part became the Combined Operations Development Centre which in August 1942 was absorbed into the newly established Combined Ops Experimental Establishment (COXE) in North Devon. DXOR was helped by three remarkable scientists, Geoffrey Pyke (see
HABBAKUK), J. D. Bernal, and Solly Zuckerman. Sharing secrets with civilians was, like COHQ itself, a previously unheard-of innovation and initially this trio had difficulty in extracting the right questions from service officers requesting their advice. Pyke expressed his frustration by quoting G. K. Chesterton's character Father Brown: ‘It isn't that they cannot see the solution: they cannot see the problem’; but eventually all three scientists were able to make an invaluable contribution to the many questions that amphibious warfare posed. COXE, too, was very much involved in solving problems and both establishments could count among their achievements the
MULBERRIES, artificial harbours built for the Normandy landings (see
OVERLORD), and the best methods for waterproofing vehicles and tanks, for unloading stores on a beach, and for piping petrol across the Channel (see
PLUTO).
Though the landings on
Madagascar in May 1942 showed that amphibious training was on the right lines the
Dieppe raid that August revealed severe deficiencies in amphibious techniques when assaulting a defended coastline. As a result research began into producing specialized landing craft whose fire power could give close support to troops making an opposed landing; schools were started for the clearance of beach obstacles, for beach parties, and for beach pilotage (see
Combined Operations Pilotage Parties); a headquarters ship with adequate signals equipment was designed to command amphibious operations; and a permanent force of landing craft was created to act as a nucleus for any future raid (see
Force J). By April 1943 COHQ's staff had grown from 23 to more than 350 and it controlled 89 landing ships (LSI), more than 2,600 landing craft, and 50,000 men. This was too much even for Mountbatten who now decentralized his command. With his full approval, all his naval responsibilities reverted to the Admiralty.
In August 1943 Mountbatten was appointed Supreme Commander of
South-East Asia Command. By then an Anglo-American staff (see
COSSAC) had been already been established for several months to plan the cross-Channel assault on occupied France, and several COHQ planners were part of it. Mountbatten had always argued for Normandy as the best place to land and this was eventually agreed upon. By the time Mountbatten departed, in October 1943, COHQ had become a valuable source of knowledge about amphibious operations. The COS were divided on its future but eventually decided to retain it though reduced in size. Mountbatten's successor, Maj-General Robert Laycock, reported to the COS but was not one of them, though he often sat with them and still had direct access to Churchill. He retained control of the commandos and responsibility for small-scale raids, but these he now had to clear with COSSAC. He also remained responsible for the assault training of British troops overseas and for giving technical advice to force comanders who were obliged to ask for it.
The Normandy landings were the ultimate fruition of Mountbatten's planning, energy, and ingenuity during his time as CCO. He was not there to witness them but on 12 June Churchill signalled him that: ‘Today we visited the British and American Armies on the soil of France. We sailed through vast fleets of ships with landing craft of many types pouring more men, vehicles and stores ashore…we realise that much of this remarkable technique and therefore the success of the venture has its origin in developments effected by you and your staff of Combined Operations.’
Bibliography
Fergusson, B. , The Watery Maze: The Story of Combined Operations (London, 1961).
