Clark Field, attack on

Clark Field, attack on, Japanese air raid on principal US air base in the Philippines on 8 December 1941 (see Philippines campaigns). It was as big a military disaster for the USA as the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor which preceded it by some hours.

Taking off from Formosa, 108 bombers of the Eleventh Japanese Air Fleet, escorted by 84 fighters, attacked Clark Field and a fighter base at Iba, both of which were situated on the Philippines main island, Luzon. Half the 35 B17 Flying Fortresses at Clark Field—the most powerful American striking force in the Far East—56 fighters, and 30 miscellaneous aircraft were destroyed. Many others were damaged, installations were burnt out, and 80 men were killed and more than 150 wounded. In one stroke the Japanese had overcome the main obstacle to their expansion southwards.

General MacArthur, the US commander in the Philippines, was first informed of Pearl Harbor at 0330 on 8 December 1941. Manuel Quezon, the president of the Philippines, later remarked that the general ‘was convinced for some strange reason that the Philippines would remain neutral and would not be attacked’. MacArthur's air commander, Maj-General Brereton, twice requested permission to bomb Japanese airfields on Formosa—though MacArthur later denied that he had—and an attack was eventually authorized at 1100, but the raid was then deferred until an air reconnaissance mission had been completed. As Brereton later pointed out, if the raid had been authorized immediately the bombers would have been airborne when the base was attacked. The Japanese were, in fact, fearful of an immediate raid on their Formosa airfields: they knew the Americans must have been alerted by the Pearl Harbor raid: and fog, which prevented their force from leaving at dawn as planned, did not lift until 1015.

However, when other Japanese aircraft were first sighted, at 0900, the bombers were ordered into the air in case Clark Field was attacked. But as the Japanese force despatched to destroy the bombers was approaching northern Luzon the B17s received the all-clear signal and were ordered to land to prepare for the Formosa raid.

Shortly after 1130 reports began coming in of the Japanese force heading for Clark and Iba. At 1145 a warning was dispatched but was apparently never received; a radio warning also failed; and a telephone call had no effect. Fighter squadrons were scrambled from other bases to intercept, but all the aircraft at Clark were on the ground when the Japanese bombers arrived at about 1230. Three fighters managed to take off, and they, helped by others, shot down six or seven Japanese fighters, but the bombers were unscathed. The anti-aircraft defences proved totally inadequate. Only one in six shells exploded and those that did were well below their targets.

After the war, MacArthur, his chief of staff, Maj-General Richard Sutherland, and Brereton all issued conflicting accounts of the disaster. No answers were found as to why authorization to attack Formosa had been delayed; why warnings to Clark Field of the Japanese attack had been either ignored or had failed to arrive; why the bombers had not been dispersed; and why they had been there anyway when it was known how vulnerable the base was to air attacks from Formosa.