Berlin air offensive

Berlin air offensive, RAF defeat which followed air offensives against the Ruhr ( March– July 1943) and Hamburg ( July– August 1943). After the success of the latter RAF Bomber Command's C-in-C, Harris, was determined to concentrate maximum effort against Berlin in the belief that if the same destruction could be inflicted on the German capital as on Hamburg then it could bring about the surrender of Germany. The Combined Chiefs of Staff raised no objection to Harris's proposal, even though the Quebec conference in August 1943 (see QUADRANT), had excluded attacks on morale as a specific means of achieving the aims of the Combined Bomber Offensive (CBO).

During the period from 23 August to 4 September 1943 the RAF mounted three attacks against Berlin, but they proved costly, with 126 bombers (7.7%) failing to return out of a total of 1,647 dispatched. Harris therefore decided to postpone the start of the offensive until the longer winter nights and also until various new electronic countermeasures (see electronic warfare) then under development had come into service. He also hoped that the Eighth US Army Air Force, then still smarting from their severe reverse in the Regensburg–Schweinfurt raid of 17 August, would join the offensive. A second disastrous raid on Schweinfurt in October and diversion of replacement aircraft from the Eighth Army Air Force to the newly formed Fifteenth US Army Air Force in the Mediterranean meant that this was not to be.

Consequently, Harris was forced to proceed alone, before some of his electronic navigation systems were ready, and on the night of 18/19 November made his first attack. Out of 444 aircraft sent to Berlin, only nine failed to return. Much of the reason for this was a large diversionary raid against Mannheim–Ludwigshafen, which attracted most of the night fighters. Three more raids against the capital were mounted before the month was out and aircraft casualties remained encouragingly low. Thick cloud over the city, however, meant that few crews actually saw their target and post-raid photographs were hard to obtain. The same was true for the four attacks against Berlin in December, but there was an increase in the bomber loss rate from just over 4% to just under 5%. Harris, however, persisted, even though the weather worsened in January, and he was being pressed by the air ministry to concentrate on targets which would wear down the Luftwaffe, a primary objective of the CBO. Five attacks were made in January, but just over 6.1% of the 2,563 sorties dispatched failed to return. The weather during the first half of February was too adverse for major operations, but when the bombers returned to Berlin on the night of 15/16 February 42 out of 891 were posted as missing.

By now it was becoming clear to Harris that the weather and the German defences meant that his bombers were not making the hoped-for impression on Berlin. Indeed, he did not attack it again until the night of 24/25 March, when 9.1% of the aircraft were lost. Even though a rejuvenated Eighth US Army Air Force was now belatedly attacking Berlin by day, it was too late. It had proved too tough a target for the RAF's capabilities. In any event, the end of the time allotted to the CBO was fast approaching and Harris and Spaatz, in spite of their protests, were about to be placed under Eisenhower's control in order to help prepare the ground for the long awaited cross-Channel invasion (see OVERLORD). Total Bomber Command losses against Berlin amounted to 492 bom bers, and though the city was badly damaged it did not cease to function as the German capital. See also strategic air offensives, 1.

Charles Messenger

Bibliography

Messenger, C. , ‘Bomber’ Harris and the Strategic Bombing Offensive, 1939–1945 (London, 1984).
Middlebrook, M. , The Berlin Raids, RAF Bomber Command, Winter 1943–44 (London, 1988).