Afrika Korps

Afrika Korps, or Deutsches Afrika Korps (DAK), was the formation Rommel, then a maj-general, commanded tactically from February to August 1941 in the Western Desert campaigns. From August 1941 to March 1943 it was always the spearhead of his several larger commands (Panzer Group Africa, Panzer Army Africa, and German–Italian Panzer Army), and when he was appointed C-in-C of Army Group Africa in March 1943 it became part of the Italian First Army under General Messe.

The dispatch of a German force to the Western Desert was first discussed in December 1940. Italian defeats prompted Hitler to issue his directive No. 22 on 11 January 1941 ordering the formation of a Sperrverband (special blocking detachment) to bolster the Italian defence of western Libya. To carry out this operation (SONNENBLUME), the 5th Light Division was formed and was soon joined by the 15th Panzer Division, and on 3 February Rommel was appointed ‘Commander of German Army troops in Africa’. The new formation was officially named the Deutsches Afrika Korps on 19 February 1941, by which time part of the 5th Light Division (renamed 21st Panzer Division, 1 October 1941) had already arrived at Tripoli. Later, various Italian formations were attached to it and it was supported from the air by units detached from 10th Fliegerkorps based in Italy under the command of a Fliegerführer Afrika.

It says much for Rommel's powers of leadership that the two German divisions initially under his command, which were both hastily formed from an assortment of units, none of them with any desert experience, were welded so soon into a formation with so strong an identity, which quickly became legendary. ‘Between Rommel and his troops there was that mutual understanding which cannot be explained and analysed,’ wrote one of his staff officers, ‘but which is the gift of the gods. The Afrika Korps followed Rommel wherever he led, however hard he drove them.’

Rommel was technically subordinate to the Italian C-in-C in North Africa, and through him to the Italian High Command (see Comando Supremo), but as he had the right to appeal to Berlin his independent command was unfettered by Italian wishes or orders. However, he was hamstrung by several limiting factors: ULTRA intelligence often revealed his plans, though he did not always follow them; his supply line during the battle for supremacy in the Mediterranean was always threatened and frequently disrupted; his main port, Tripoli, was inadequate; and Hitler and his subordinates, absorbed in greater events elsewhere, viewed the Western Desert as no more than a holding campaign.

The tactics of the DAK reversed the generally accepted contemporary theory that tanks were best employed to destroy other tanks before penetrating the infantry's lines to attack the rear areas. Rommel stood this principle on its head by using an anti-tank gun line to destroy the oncoming armour, enabling his tanks to deal with the opposing infantry. These tactics were employed during the British offensive (BATTLEAXE) of June 1941. They resulted in a victory for the DAK which did much to create the pride and self-confidence that marked its later battles and it remained a formidable force throughout Rommel's time in the western desert and in the North African campaign. It was a DAK Assault Group which was largely responsible for his victory at the Kasserine Pass in February 1943 and it was one of the last units to surrender in Tunisia, when, just before midnight on 12 May 1943, its commander signalled: ‘Ammunition shot off. Arms and equipment destroyed. In accordance with order received Afrika Korps has fought itself to the condition where it can fight no more. The German Afrika Korps must rise again. Heia Safari!’

Heia Safari was the DAK's Swahili warcry. Meaning ‘Let's go get 'em’, or ‘Tallyho!’, it proved entirely appropriate.

Bibliography

Lewin, R. , The Life and Death of the Afrika Korps (London, 1977).