The Cold War Continued: Nuclear Arms Race, Arms Control, and Détente

THE COLD WAR CONTINUED: NUCLEAR ARMS RACE, ARMS CONTROL, AND DéTENTE

The Arms Race

After World War II the United States and the Soviet Union began a nuclear arms race that continued unabated throughout the 1960s. For most of the 1950s both countries concentrated on manufacturing atomic and hydrogen bombs and the intercontinental bomber force necessary to deliver them. Both countries also developed short-range and intermediate-range missiles that could be armed with nuclear warheads, as well as nuclear weapons to be used on the battlefield.

The Space Race

The 5 October 1957 launch by the Soviet Union of Sputnik, the first man-made satellite to orbit the earth, dramatically changed the arms race. Re-acting with shock and embarrassment, the Americans rushed to launch their own satellites. Throughout the 1960s the United States and the Soviets competed to see which country could be the first to demonstrate a particular feat in space. On 25 May 1961 President Kennedy announced a program to put a man on the moon by the end of the decade and asked Congress to fund the project. This goal was accomplished on 20 July 1969 when American Neil Armstrong walked on the surface of the moon From an intelligence point of view, any nation that demonstrates the ability to launch satellites into orbit also has the capability to develop and deploy intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). Further, every successful launch of a satellite or any other space project is evidence of the reliability of all launch vehicles including ICBMs. In addition to technological advances that resulted from the space race, it also brought public relations benefits, demonstrating American technical sophistication to a marveling world.

The Missile Race

Throughout the 1960s the United States and the Soviet Union made massive efforts to develop, build, and deploy strategic forces that relied primarily on ICBMs and SLBMs (submarine-launched ballistic missiles) armed with nuclear warheads. Bombers gave way to missiles. In 1963 the United States had 630 intercontinental bombers to 190 for the Soviets; by 1972 bombers had dropped to 457 for the United States and 156 for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. During the same time period, however, the United States had increased its number of ICBMs from 424 to 1,054 and its SLBMs from 224 to 656, while the Soviets increased their ICBM force from 90 to 1,533 and their SLBMs from 107 to 437. The number of nuclear warheads each country possessed had grown to match the numbers of launch vehicles, with the exception of American war-heads for SLBMs, which increased from 224 in 1963 to 2,096 in 1972. (A technological breakthrough allowed the United States to mount multiple warheads on their SLBMs.) By the end of the decade the United States and the Soviet Union had each stockpiled enough nuclear weapons to destroy one another—and the entire world—several times over.

Changes in Strategy

As both the United States and the Soviet Union converted from reliance on bombs delivered by intercontinental bombers to reliance on nuclear warheads delivered by ICBMs or SLBMs, strategic doctrine adjusted to the new technology. When each country's nuclear force was primarily delivered by bomber, it was possible to have time to intercept an attacking bomber with antiaircraft missiles or with interceptor aircraft, and both countries had developed elaborate air-defense systems. With the approximate thirty-minute flight time for a warhead launched from an ICBM and an even shorter flight time for warheads from SLBMs, there was too little warning time to allow interception. The Soviet Union and the United States were vulnerable to attack by one another; in effect, each held the other's population hostage. This ability led to the strategic doctrine known as Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD)—each country would be deterred from attacking the other because it could not escape the enormous damage resulting from retaliation.

Development of Spy Satellites

The space race benefited arms control. Both the Soviet Union and the United States developed and deployed spy satellites that allowed them to monitor reliably one another's nuclear tests, missile launches, and military deployments on a constant basis. Spy satellites provided a steadier flow of information than U-2 flights, and satellites were not as intrusive as spy plane overflights. By the end of the decade each side had developed and deployed sufficient technical means to simplify greatly the job of verifying compliance with arms control agreements. Problems with verification had been a major sticking point in the attempts to negotiate arms control agreements during the 1950s and the early 1960s. The spy satellites helped make possible the arms control agreements of the mid and late 1960s and the 1970s. By the end of the decade each of the two superpowers was relatively confident that it possessed the capability to destroy the other with a nuclear attack and that it had an adequate possibility of monitoring the other.

Political Climate Changes

After the Cuban missile crisis of October 1962, in which the United States and the Soviet Union came perilously close to nuclear war, both sides became less bellicose. Another factor that contributed toward reduced tension between the United States and the Soviet Union during the decade was the increased hostility between the Soviets and the People's Republic of China. On 1 January 1963 the Chinese criticized Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev's actions during the Cuban missile crisis and his idea of "peaceful coexistence" between the Soviet bloc and the West. The Soviets responded with denunciations of the Chinese on 7 January and 30 August. The Communist Chinese added to the Soviets' concerns when they detonated a nuclear device for the first time on 16 October 1964. This event added another, potentially hostile, member to the "nuclear club," one that shared a long border with the Soviet Union. By 1969 there were armed border clashes between the Soviet Union and Communist China. In an atmosphere of reduced tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union but increased tension between the Soviets and the Chinese, several small steps were taken toward arms control.

Nuclear-Test Ban Talks

Since the late 1950s scientists and the public had become increasingly concerned that radioactive fallout from aboveground tests was a serious health hazard. During the spring of 1963 the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union resumed talks on banning aboveground nuclear tests, negotiations that had been suspended in early 1962. Agreement was reached rapidly, and on 5 August 1963 the three countries signed a treaty banning nuclear testing in the atmosphere, in outer space, and underwater. Compliance was partially monitored through satellites designed to detect the radioactivity released by such tests. Since the adoption of this treaty more than one hundred additional countries have signed it. France and the People's Republic of China have refused to sign the treaty although each voluntarily refrains from violating its provisions.

U.S./Soviet Cooperation Despite Differences

The spirit of cooperation in U.S./Soviet relations in 1963 was in sharp contrast to the intense hostility of the previous fall. Kennedy's trip to Berlin—where he proclaimed, "Ich bin ein Berliner" (literally: I am a jelly doughnut; he should have said, "Ich bin Berlinisch") in a speech on 26 June 1963—was motivated at least in part by a need to reaffirm the U.S. commitment to Berlin, whose population had become increasingly nervous in light of the improvement in U.S./Soviet relations. During the rest of the decade relations between the United States and the Soviet Union remained reasonably stable and paved the way for the policy of détente espoused by Richard Nixon when he became president in 1969. The two countries were able to compartmentalize their differences over the Six Day War involving Israel against Jordan, Syria, and Egypt, in June 1967, over the invasion of Czechoslovakia by the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact forces in 1968, and over the escalating U.S. effort in Vietnam. They were also able to conclude two more arms control agreements during the 1960s and to begin the negotiations that resulted in another two agreements in the early 1970s. On 27 January 1967 the United States and the Soviet Union were among the sixty-two nations who signed a treaty that prohibited the military use of space.

The Glassboro Summit

After increasing tensions between Israel and Egypt during May 1967, Israel began launching attacks against several Arab countries on 5 June. By the ninth the war was over, with Israel taking control of the Sinai, the city of Jerusalem, the west bank of the Jordan River, and the Golan Heights. While the United States backed the Israelis and the Soviet Union adamantly backed Syria's demand for the return of the Golan Heights, the two countries made extensive use of the hot line to keep the relationship between them calm. In June Soviet premier Aleksey Kosygin led a special Soviet delegation to New York to take part in a U.N. effort to find a solution to the Arab/Israeli dilemma. He subsequently attended a summit meeting with President Johnson on the campus of Glassboro State College in New Jersey. They were unable to reach a consensus on the Middle East crisis, and the Arab/Israeli problem continued to be a stress point in U.S./Soviet relations into the next decade. They also discussed the Vietnam War, but they were not successful in resolving issues that prevented the United States and the North Vietnamese from starting peace talks. Three different arms control issues were on the agenda. For some time the two countries had unsuccessfully explored ways to limit the growth of their strategic nuclear arsenals. In 1964 Johnson had offered a proposal that would have frozen strategic weapons systems at their existing levels. The Soviets refused, at least in part because of security concerns rising from China's explosion of a nuclear device in 1964. Johnson and Kosygin discussed the possibility of a strategic arms limitation treaty (SALT), but the Soviets insisted they would not begin SALT talks until there was a nuclear nonproliferation treaty to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons to countries that did not have them already. They also discussed the possibility of an agreement which would place limits on antiballistic missile (ABM) systems. The Soviets had begun deploying a limited system by 1967, and the U.S. military was pressing Johnson for a commitment to build a U.S. system. Again the Soviets demurred until there was some resolution of the nuclear proliferation issue. Johnson and Kosygin did make some progress on issues that paved the way for the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty of 1968.

The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty

On 1 July 1968 the United States and the Soviet Union were among the signatories to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. This treaty, which went into effect in 1970, stipulates that none of the five (at the time) nuclear powers would transfer nuclear weapons to nonnuclear states or assist them in developing nuclear weapons. To date some 136 countries have signed the treaty although neither France nor China (two of the five original nuclear powers) has yet signed it; France has announced that it will abide by the provisions of the agreement. After the treaty was signed on 1 July the Soviet Union and the United States made simultaneous announcements that they would begin talks in September on limiting strategic weapons.

Postponement of Strategic Weapons Negotiations

The talks did not start as scheduled. Throughout the spring of 1968 Czechoslovakia had enjoyed a liberalization program known as the "Prague Spring" under the government of Aleksander Dubcek. Some critics of communism called for the establishment of a democracy with free elections in a multiparty system. On 20 August 1968 the Soviet Union, fearful over the potential loss of Communist control and a Czechoslovak tilt toward the West, sent Warsaw Pact forces under Soviet command into Czechoslovakia in a move reminiscent of the Soviet invasion of Hungary in 1956. The invading force quickly took control of the country, reversed the liberalization process, and reestablished tight Communist party control. In protest the United States delayed the start of the SALT talks.

Nixon Agrees to SALT Talks

After Richard Nixon became President in January 1969 and in the absence of an agreement to limit ABM systems, his administration made a decision to go ahead with a U.S. ABM program. The delayed SALT negotiations began in Helsinki on 17 November 1969.

Sources:

Fred Kaplan, The Wizards of Armageddon (New York: Simon 6c Schuster, 1983);

Michael Mandelbaum, The Nuclear Question: The United States and Nuclear Weapons, 1946-1976 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1979);

Bruce Russett and Harvey Starr, World Politics: The Menu for Choice, fourth edition (San Francisco: Freeman, 1992).