Cold War: The Bomb

COLD WAR: THE BOMB

Its Public and Political Acceptance

After U.S. bombers shocked the world in August 1945 by dropping horrendously destructive atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki to end World War II, the administration of President Harry S Truman pledged never again to introduce atomic weapons into a conflict. By November 1950, however, the president was reconsidering. Responding to reports by military advisers that A-bombs could shorten the Korean War by efficiently destroying Soviet military bases in Asia and forcing the Soviet and Chinese Communists to think twice before intervening, Truman made veiled references to the option of atomic force to end the conflict.

Public Support for the Bomb

If Truman had decided to employ atomic weapons in Korea, he would have had little trouble selling the idea to the American people. In 1949 a Gallup poll determined that 70 percent of Americans were against their government's pledge of no first use. By the winter of 1951, 51 percent supported using the bomb against "military targets" in Asia. As the American fear of Communist aggression grew, so too did infatuation with the bomb as a symbol of U.S. military and technological superiority. Sen. Margaret Chase Smith (R-Maine) appealed to the feeling of moral superiority of many Americans in the summer of 1951 when she suggested that the United States "drop the atomic bomb on these barbarians" if the Korean peace talks failed. Clearly both President Truman and his successor in 1953, President Eisenhower, had a mandate to stockpile weapons of mass destruction and declare the nation's resolve in using them if faced with a Communist threat.

The Bomb and Political Realities

As is often the case, however, public perception and political reality did not go hand in hand. The complexities of the emerging new world order meant that the Truman and Eisenhower administrations—despite their saber rattling—often had to give ground to the Soviets on political fronts. In 1949 the Soviet Union had successfully tested its first atomic bomb, and at the beginning of 1950 it seemed to be keeping pace with the Americans in developing the next generation of nuclear weapons—hydrogen bombs.

A Foreign-Policy Tool

With both sides having deployed hundreds of H-bombs by the mid 1950s—and each well on its way toward developing the kind of rocketry needed to deliver them—it became clear to foreign-policy experts that the arms race had become necessary if wars between the East and the West were to be avoided. Each side needed to maintain enough weapons to be able to strike back forcefully if attacked, deterring a potential aggressor by the possibility of massive retaliation; the result was a balance of destructive power. So long as the balance was maintained, the cold war would remain a battle of words and threats.

The Bomb and Government Policy

In April 1950 Paul H. Nitze, director of policy planning in the State Department under Truman, completed a key defense-policy document, National Security Council memorandum-68 (NSC-68). Nitze recommended massive increases in defense spending to respond to the Communist menace. The money was mostly to be spent on conventional forces, but Nitze's plan also underscored America's need to develop the hydrogen bomb. The Democratic president agreed, despite strong Republican opposition.

New Look Policy

Among the top goals of the Republican Eisenhower administration in 1953 were to tighten the country's purse strings and lower defense spending. As a result Eisenhower adopted a new cold war strategy called the New Look policy. It supported nuclear armament over troop deployments to avoid the costs of full-scale conventional warfare. Eisenhower's secretary of state, John Foster Dulles, immediately began a program of attacking the political "taboo" that had surrounded the use of the bomb since Hiroshima and Nagasaki. "No use in having stuff, and never being able to use it," he insisted. Truman's pledge of no first use was soon replaced with a policy that would allow for atomic strikes in response to even a conventional armed attack. In 1953 Eisenhower strongly hinted that "it might be cheaper, dollar-wise," to rely on A-bombs instead of ground troops to end the Korean War. Unlike Truman, however, Eisenhower had the weight of accepted policy to back up his threats.

"Atoms for Peace."

Eisenhower had a broader vision of atomic power than the New Look policy suggested, however. In a speech delivered to the United Nations on 8 October 1953, Eisenhower proposed "atoms for peace." His hopes were sincere, for he understood that an arms race could drive the superpowers into bankruptcy. Nonetheless, the Soviet Union looked upon Eisenhower's proposal with cynicism, partly because Eisenhower's own administration did not pursue his ideas of peaceful uses of atomic energy with any vigor. The speech did lead to the establishment of the International Atomic Energy Agency to monitor atomic research and testing globally, but the lack of cooperation between the superpowers often crippled its effectiveness.

Bombs and Rockets

After the Soviets successfully launched Sputnik on 4 October 1957, American confidence and feelings of military superiority gave way to fear. It seemed that the Soviet Union had gained an edge in rocket technology, and Americans felt that Eisenhower had not been vigilant enough. It no longer seemed to matter how many bombs the government stored if the Soviets could launch an attack from Soviet soil or, worse, rain bombs on the United States from outer space. By the end of the decade missile development had become a dominant political issue. Despite the fact that by 1960 the United States had regained a technological advantage over the Soviet Union, the Democrats were successful in playing off American fears that the Soviets had better—and more—delivery systems. The new Democratic president, John F. Kennedy, entered the White House in January 1961 with a mandate to build more bombs and more missiles.

BOMB SHELTERS: "LIFE SAFES" OR
"DEATH TRAPS?"

Throughout the decade construction firms cashed in on public fear of atomic annihilation and were offering a wide array of bomb shelters, or "life safes," ranging from a $13.50 backyard foxhole to a spacious $5,500 underground suite complete with all the household amenities—and a Geiger counter to boot. Public fear of the Soviets' ability to deliver the bomb over long distances became more acute and widespread in 1957, when Russian scientists were able to launch a satellite into orbit. Civil Defense Administrator Val Peterson, who had dismissed bomb shelters as "death traps," suddenly was being urged by citizen groups to consider a nationwide shelter program. With the Eisenhower administration being characterized as uncaring in its approach to civil defense, Peterson displayed a new attitude in March 1957 and told reporters that he "believes in bomb shelters" but insisted that the construction cost for a national shelter program would run as high as $32 billion—numbers that infuriated Eisenhower critics who charged Peterson with callously placing a cost on human lives.

Sources:

Nation (23 March 1957): 246;
Time (5 February 1951): 12.

Sources:

Stephen E. Ambrose, Eisenhower: The President (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1984);

James Gilbert, Another Chance: Postwar America, 1945-1968 (Philadelphia, Pa.: Temple University Press, 1981).