THE SIT-DOWN STRIKE IN THE 1930s

Background

The New Deal climate of the 1930s gave industrial workers an unprecedented chance to improve their conditions by organizing into unions. Led by powerful labor leader John L. Lewis, the Committee for Industrial Organizations (CIO) was created in 1935 to give the nation's thirty million nonskilled workers a chance to unionize. A major new weapon in organizing workers and fighting for better conditions was the sit-down strike. Prior to the sit-down strike, unions could only overcome the fears and suspicions of workers by mounting a success fill strike. Strikes, however, often erupted in violence and were rarely successful unless a majority of the workers supported the effort.

Passive Resistance

Sit-down strikes enabled a small number of workers to stop the production of an entire company by taking physical possession of the plant and its machines. By occupying a single strategic area of a plant, strikers could encourage others to join the strike and shut down the plant until the employer agreed to deal with the union. Sit-down strikes brought production to a total and immediate halt and eliminated the use of scab workers to break the strike. A benefit of the wave of sit-down strikes in the 1930s was that there were no casualties and little property damage as compared to normal strikes. The sit-down strike was a form of passive resistance that moved away from the violence surrounding strikes.

Origins

The first sit-down strike in the United States occurred at the Hormel Packing Company in Austin, Minnesota, in 1933. Over the next two years the phenomenon spread to auto plants in Cleveland and Detroit and to the Goodyear factory in Akron. By 1936 union leaders were relying on it in many industries. According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, there were 48 sit-downs in 1936, involving 88,000 workers, In 1937 alone the number increased to 477 sit-downs involving 400,000 workers, and in 1938 there were 52 such strikes with 30,000 workers participating.

Impact

The sit-down had its most dramatic effect on the automobile industry. In 1936 the United Automobile Workers of America (UAW) demanded recognition from the major automobile companies according to the provisions of the Wagner Act, but the large corporations were not willing to make concessions. The UAW decided to take on General Motors in Flint, Michigan, a town dominated by GM where the UAW local had only 122 members in early 1936. The sit-down strike began in the Fisher Body plant of GM on 31 December 1936 and lasted forty-four days. Like a brush fire, the strike spread to Detroit, Cleveland, Toledo, and other industrial cities. Soon GM production stood at a standstill, with 112,000 of 150,000 plants idle.

Counterattack

GM called the sit-down an unlawful invasion of property rights and wanted the strikers ejected by force. Homer S. Martin, president of the UAW, countered, stating, "what more sacred property right is there in the world today than the right of a man to his job?" The CIO was, at first, skeptical of the strike but soon supported the UAW with all its resources. GM demanded that the Michigan state militia be used to break the strike. Gov. Frank Murphy of Michigan, however, was sympathetic to the strikers and feared the bloodshed that would occur if he called in the troops.

Response

GM received a court order setting 3 February as the deadline for the workers to evacuate the plants or risk a penalty of imprisonment and fines. In response to the deadline, the workers cabled Governor Murphy explaining that "unarmed as we are, the introduction of the militia, sheriffs, or police with murderous weapons will mean a blood bath of unarmed workers. We have decided to stay in the plant." The 3 February deadline passed and Murphy refused to unleash the militia on the striking workers. President Roosevelt intervened and requested the continuation of negotiations between the union and GM, so for another week the strikers held the plant until an agreement was reached on 11 February 1937. As a result of the sit-down, GM recognized the UAW as the bargaining agent for the workers, and this opened the way for a collective bargaining agreement. William S. Knudsen, the antiunion GM executive, hailed the new agreement and said, "Let us have peace and make cars."

Success

The Flint sit-down strike was a major success. It led to many grievances being reconciled. The enthusiasm about Flint led to many autoworkers forming new unions faster than the UAW could send them organizers. The sit-down strike even outgrew the labor leaders and the unions; workers realized that they could strike at will. The UAW could not stop the spontaneous strikes that began to break out nationwide. An important consequence of this movement was that auto union membership increased from 35,000 in 1935 to 375,000 in 1937.

Effects

Because of the increased power of the CIO, many major corporations began to rethink their positions regarding unionism. United States Steel, perhaps the most antiunion large corporation, settled with Lewis without a strike soon after the Flint campaign. Another automotive leader, Chrysler, also settled with the CIO after a short, peaceful, and effective sit-down strike. Over the next two years Firestone, Goodrich, RCA, and General Electric all made collective bargaining agreements and recognized their unions.

Resentment

Although the sit-down strike was a successful tool in organizing unions, it was also a short-lived phenomenon. As the strikes increased across the country, popular resentment grew. Conservative newspapers condemned the strikes, and few supported the workers. After much spirited debate the Senate declared the strikes illegal and a form of trespassing. Gallup polls indicated that an overwhelming majority of people opposed the sit-down strike and that new laws needed to be enacted to curb the power of the unions.

Sources:

Irving Bernstein, Turbulent Years: A History of the American Worker, 1933-1941 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1970);

Foster Rhea Dulles, Labor in America: A History (New York: Crowell, 1949).