London (Roundtable) Conference (1939)

LONDON (ROUNDTABLE) CONFERENCE (1939)

Conference convened at St. James's Palace (London) to consider the future of Palestine.

In late 1938, as fears of a European war loomed, Britain sought ways of pacifying growing Arab displeasure over her pro-Zionist policy in Palestine. On 7 November 1938 the British Cabinet proposed convening a conference that would bring together Jews and Arabs in "separate parallel discussions between His Majesty's Government and the Arabs, and His Majesty's Government and the Jews."

The Palestinian position heading into the conference called for the establishment of an Arab national government in Palestine; the cessation of all Jewish immigration; the prohibition of further land sales to Jews; and the granting of minority rights to Jews. Representatives of several Arab states met in Cairo in January 1939 and agreed on a joint position. During the days leading up to the opening session, Jewish Agency Chairman David Ben-Gurion advocated the following four guidelines for the Zionist negotiation strategy: no concessions on immigration; no Arab state, but a regime based on parity in Palestine; cantonization might be acceptable if the Jewish area was not less than that recommended by the Peel Report and if control over immigration were in Jewish hands; and a Jewish state would be willing to belong to a future Middle Eastern confederation.

The conference opened at St. James's Palace on 7 February 1939. Representatives of Egypt, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Transjordan, Yemen, and the Palestinians (led by Jamal al-Husayni, George Antonius, and Musa al-Alami) met with British officials, who held parallel discussions with members of the Jewish delegation. Colonial Secretary Malcolm MacDonald served as host and go-between. Because of the Arab refusal to meet directly with the Jewish delegation, the British managed to convene only two informal meetings between several representatives from the Arab states and Jewish delegates.

During the lengthy discussions, the Arabs presented their position as formulated in Cairo, demanding an end to the Mandate and insisting on the creation of an independent Arab state in Palestine. They also argued that the Husayn–McMahon Correspondence (1915–1916), which they interpreted as including Palestine within the areas of promised Arab independence, took precedence over the 1917 Balfour Declaration, which committed Britain to promote a Jewish national home in Palestine. The Jews, for their part, would not budge from their insistence on large-scale immigration into Palestine, becoming even more adamant in light of Adolf Hitler's escalating anti-Jewish policies and the recent annexation of Austria.

Faced with no prospect of mutual agreement after some three dozen sessions with the parties, on 15 March 1939 Malcolm MacDonald outlined Britain's proposals: After ten years, a Palestinian state would be created, possibly a federation with Arab and Jewish cantons. Since the Arabs would have a majority in the assembly, legal guarantees would be included for the Jewish minority and its national home. During the coming five years, 75,000 Jewish immigrants (of whom 25,000 would be refugees) would be admitted into Palestine. Subsequent immigration would depend on Arab consent.

The conference officially ended on 17 March. Chaim Weizmann informed MacDonald that the Zionists were unable to accept Britain's terms. British officials in Cairo resumed contact with representatives of the Arab states, leading to some modifications of MacDonald's provisions in an effort to gain fuller Arab acceptance of the proposed new British policy. Finally, on 17 May 1939, Britain published the MacDonald White Paper, the end result of the London conference's failure to reach an Arab-Zionist agreement. Its terms—admittedly "disappointing to both Jews and Arabs"—would govern Britain's official Palestine policy for the coming war years, although little was implemented on the ground, with both Arab and Zionist leaders continuing their efforts to obtain changes favorable to their respective causes.

see also balfour declaration (1917); husayn–mcmahon correspondence (1915–1916); macdonald, malcolm; white papers on palestine.

Bibliography

Caplan, Neil. Futile Diplomacy, Vol. 2: Arab-Zionist Negotiations and the End of the Mandate, 1931–1948. Totowa, NJ; London: Frank Cass, 1986.

Lesch, Ann Mosely. Arab Politics in Palestine, 1917–1939: The Frustration of a Nationalist Movement. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1979.

Porath, Yehoshua. The Palestinian Arab National Movement: From Riots to Rebellion, vol. 2, 1929–1939. Totowa, NJ; London: Frank Cass, 1977.

Rose, Norman A. The Gentile Zionists: A Study in Anglo-Zionist Diplomacy, 1929–1939. London: Frank Cass, 1973.

neil caplan