Camp David Accords (1978)

CAMP DAVID ACCORDS (1978)

agreements signed by egypt, israel, and the united states on 17 september 1978.

In November 1977, Egyptian president Anwar alSadat shocked the world by announcing his readiness to travel to Israel to resolve the Arab–Israel conflict, and Israeli prime minister Menachem Begin promptly issued an invitation. Sadat's visit to Israel on 19 and 20 November included an electrifying speech before the Knesset and inaugurated a series of unprecedented direct Egyptian–Israeli peace negotiations. The talks bogged down, however, over Israel's withdrawal from and Egypt's demilitarization of the Sinai and the future status of Gaza and the West Bank (all occupied by Israel in the June 1967 war), and over terms of normalization between Israel and Egypt. When it appeared that the negotiations would collapse, U.S. president Jimmy Carter invited Sadat and Begin to the presidential retreat at Camp David, Maryland.

The Camp David conference, 5 through 17 September 1978, ended with two accords signed by Egypt, Israel, and the United States: "A Framework for Peace in the Middle East" and "A Framework for Conclusion of a Peace Treaty between Egypt and Israel." Participants included the three leaders, their foreign and defense ministers, and teams of top civilian and military officials. Sadat and Begin's acrimonious relationship threatened to derail the conference, but President Carter's personal intervention saved it from failure. Sadat and Begin later received the Nobel Peace Prize.

The relatively straightforward framework for an Egypt–Israel peace embraced UN Security Council Resolution 242 and called for a treaty implementing the land-for-peace principle: Israel would return the Sinai to Egypt and Egypt would make peace with Israel. Also anticipated was the full normalization of diplomatic, economic, and cultural relations. The Egyptian–Israeli Peace Treaty of 26 March 1979 conformed to these September 1978 expectations.

With its complex and problematic formula for Palestinian self-rule, the framework for Middle East peace was crucial to Sadat's defense against Arab charges that he had sold the Palestinians short by making a separate peace with Israel. The other Arab states were invited to follow Sadat to the negotiating table. This framework envisioned Egypt, Israel, Jordan, and representatives of the Palestinians negotiating a five-year, three-stage plan for the future of Gaza and the West Bank, including full autonomy for the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza; the withdrawal of Israel's military government and civilian administration; the election of a self-governing Palestinian authority; and the redeployment of Israeli forces. Final-status negotiations during the five-year transitional period would resolve the disposition of the West Bank and Gaza, the refugee problem, and the entire Israeli–Palestinian conflict in a manner that would "recognize the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people and their just requirements."

The Camp David Accords were not without opposition. The Knesset ratified the agreements, but more members of the opposition than of the prime minister's coalition supported them. Those who abstained or voted against them scored Begin for accepting the precedent of territorial concessions for peace and for recognizing the Palestinian people as a negotiating partner. In Egypt, opposition elements, including Islamic, Nasserist, and other Arab nationalist groups, protested the peace negotiations with Israel. No Arab states supported the accords, and the Palestinians, aware of Begin's extremely narrow interpretation of "full autonomy," rejected them and demanded statehood. The refusal of the Palestinians and Jordan (the latter mentioned no less than fifteen times in the document) to cooperate with Egypt and Israel made the "Framework for Peace in the Middle East" a dead letter. Dependent only upon the actions of Egypt and Israel themselves, however, the second of Camp David's two frameworks—"For the Conclusion of a Peace Treaty Between Egypt and Israel"—came to fruition in the signing of the Egyptian–Israeli Peace Treaty of March 1979.

see also begin, menachem; carter, jimmy; egyptian–israeli peace treaty (1979); gaza strip; knesset; sadat, anwar al-; west bank.

Bibliography

Bar-Siman-Tov, Yaacov. Israel and the Peace Process, 1977–1982: In Search of Legitimacy for Peace. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994.

Carter, Jimmy. Keeping Faith: Memoirs of a President. New York: Bantam, 1982.

Dayan, Moshe. Breakthrough: A Personal Account of the Egypt– Israel Peace Negotiations. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1981.

Eisenberg, Laura Zittrain, and Caplan, Neil. Negotiating Arab–Israeli Peace: Patterns, Problems, and Possibilities. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1998.

Kamel, Mohammed Ibrahim. The Camp David Accords: A Testimony. London: Kegan Paul, 1986.

Quandt, William B. Camp David: Peacemaking and Politics. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1986.

Telhami, Shibley. Power and Leadership in International Bargaining: The Path to the Camp David Accords. New York: Columbia University Press, 1990.

Don Peretz

Updated by Laura Z. Eisenberg