Mexican Minister of War's Reply to Manuel De La Peña y Peña (1845, by Pedro María Anaya)

MEXICAN MINISTER OF WAR'S REPLY TO MANUEL DE LA PEÑA Y PEÑA (1845, by Pedro María Anaya)

Fearing war with the United States, in 1845 Mexico Minister of Foreign Affairs Manuel de la Peña y Peña asked Minister of War Pedro María Anaya to assess the Mexican military's readiness. In his reply, Anaya advised that Mexico should seek to reconquer lands it held in dispute with the United States. He described Mexico's previous successes defending its territory against a hodgepodge of settlers, speculators, and adventurers. Those who were usurping Mexico's northern reaches in the name of "blinding greed" were no match for Mexican troops. With enough men, guns, and blankets, Anaya wrote, Mexico's "success cannot be in doubt."

In 1846, the United States declared war on Mexico after Mexican soldiers killed American troops along the disputed Texas border. Mexico could not muster the resources Anaya called for in his letter. In 1848, de la Peña y Peña helped negotiate the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, in which Mexico ceded to the United States all territory north of the Rio Grande River, the very region Anaya had sought to reconquer.

Mark D. Baumann,
New York University

See also Mexican-American War ; Mexico, Relations with ; Texas .

Pedro Maria Anaya, Mexican Minister of War, to Manuel de la Peña y Peña, Mexican Minister of Foreign Affairs
Mexico City, December 2, 1845

This memorandum is written in answer to your note of the 6th of last month regarding the state of relations between our nation and the United States. In your letter you asked me to ascertain the number of troops that would be necessary to undertake a campaign against that country. I hereby comply with the request.

It has always been, and will always be, difficult and costly to transport a considerable number of troops over long distances. The expenses of this enterprise increase in direct proportion to the inconveniences encountered along the way. These inconveniences include topographical obstacles and troubles associated with the simple act of walking; when the enemy in possession of territory that must be traversed is taken into account, more inconveniences appear. The enemy challenges the crossing of rivers and all other natural obstructions and in their defensive position possess an advantage. These general points explain why Mexico's struggle against the usurpers of Texas has from its outset been a most difficult matter.

There are two types of military expeditions. One is carried out with the objective of defeating the enemy's forces, after which the victorious army withdraws. The other is planned with an intention to occupy, settle, and remain in the invaded territory. For the first type, boldness and temporary resources are sufficient, but for the other type constant effort and a steady flow of supplies is required. Under no circumstances should Mexico consider the first type of operation, as it would involve sacrifices which would not result in meaningful victory. Only by reconquering and holding the usurped territory may we achieve success.

At San Jacinto, all conditions favored us. The battle was waged against some miserable settlers, a few hundred adventurers, and a handful of speculators from New Orleans and New York. In itself, that skirmish was not very significant. But the years that followed it were most lamentable and seemingly sanctioned that scandalous usurpation. Now the United States, which claims to respect justice more than any other nation, presents itself on the basis of power alone as the most insolent and shameless usurper in history. Its proximity to the country that has served as its prize facilitated the establishment of its perfidious designs. Blinding greed has enabled that country easily to move armed men, who man for man are no match with our soldiers, to take possession of that fertile territory. With the United States now involved in the usurpation, our problems multiply. Now the matter involves many important considerations that exceed the realm of my official duties.

There are many possible ways to prepare for war with the United States. But I would say that for Upper California we need five battalions and 10 field pieces and for Baja California, one battalion and five field pieces. Guaymas needs one battalion and three pieces; San Blas or Tepic, two battalions and five pieces (the same force is needed for Acapulco); Campeche needs four battalions and eight pieces; Tabasco, one battalion and four pieces; Veracruz, six battalions and 12 pieces; New Mexico, one cavalry regiment; Tampico, four battalions and eight pieces; for the operating army, 16 battalions, six regiments, and 32 pieces; for the reserves, eight battalions, four regiments, and 24 pieces; for the capital of the republic, eight battalions, four regiments, and 24 pieces (these troops could be moved to other areas if needed). All of these add up to 60 battalions, 15 regiments, and 145 pieces (sic).

The three brigades of cavalry that exist by law should be brought up to strength and sent to where needed. The battalion of sappers also should be brought up to strength and assigned, with a competent section of engineers, to the operational army; another battalion of sappers should remain in the reserves. The 35 permanent presidial companies of the frontier, with the 12 active militias, should be brought up to regulations and assigned either to the defense of their own Departments, whether against foreign enemies or savages, or as the light cavalry of the operational army. In addition, it is indispensable to organize the National Guard in all the Departments of the Republic, so that in case it is needed it can aid the army, defend the coasts from enemy attack, and maintain order in the interior.

We should also organize all aspects of transporting artillery, munitions, as well as food and medical supplies in the most efficient and economic manner. All men capable of bearing arms in the Departments of Coahuila and New Mexico should be provided with necessary ammunition and weapons. In sum, the reinforced units which should be on active duty should amount to 65,087 men, of whom 531 would be sappers; 2,640, foot artillerymen; 536, mounted artillerymen; 47,340, infantrymen; 9,450, dragoons; and 4,590, presidial forces. These forces will cost 1,162,539 pesos monthly, which will include expenses for salaries, field rations, costs associated with the artillery trains, the transportation of bridges, munitions, clothing, food, hospital supplies, and miscellaneous items.

As currently constituted, our forces consist of 14,760 infantrymen, 7,550 cavalrymen (including presidial forces), and 1,445 artillerymen. Therefore, there is a need for 32,570 additional infantrymen (sic), 6,490 additional cavalrymen, and 1,731 additional artillerymen.

Troops added to existing forces will have to be clothed. Unfortunately, many of the units already in existence lack even the barest necessities and must also be clothed. Thirteen thousand rifles also need to be purchased since all existing armaments are of poor quality. I understand that there is enough ammunition to start and maintain the campaign for some time.

I have already indicated that my ministry does not have all of the necessary information to make a prudent recommendation regarding war between Mexico and the United States. However, it can supply calculations needed to arrive at a decision. In my personal opinion, if all of the recommendations of this memorandum are forthcoming, our success cannot be in doubt, because the invading nation has only a few disciplined troops, which do not match our forces in spirit or aggressiveness. It can be said without boasting that in the open field Mexican soldiers will be crowned with glory, even though they are a third fewer than the number sent against them by the enemies from the north.

SOURCE: Anaya, Pedro Maria. "Letter Replying to Manuel de la Peña y Peña." In Origins of the Mexican War: A Documentary Source Book. Edited by Ward McAfee and J. Cordell Robinson. Vol. 1. Salisbury, N.C.: Documentary Publications, 1982, pp. 143–146.