Missouri Compromise

MISSOURI COMPROMISE

MISSOURI COMPROMISE, legislation enacted by the U.S. Congress in 1820 settling the first serious American sectional crisis over slavery's expansion: the Maine statehood act of 3 March ("An Act for the admission of the state of Maine into the Union") and the Missouri enabling act of 6 March ("An Act to authorize the people of the Missouri territory to form a constitution and state government, and for the admission of such state into the Union on an equal footing with the original states, and to prohibit slavery in certain territories"). The crisis, in conjunction with economic disputes deriving from the panic of 1819, helped to undermine American national unity in the so-called "Era of Good Feelings" following the War of 1812.

Background

The Missouri controversy erupted unexpectedly in 1819, when northern congressmen objected to the Missouri Territory, part of the 1803 Louisiana Purchase from France, being admitted to the Union as a new slave state. Previously, northern congressmen had not obstructed the

admission of new slave states. Later that year, Congress would grant statehood to Alabama by a joint resolution that left its slave labor system intact. However, some northern congressmen took exception to Missouri becoming a slave state, apparently less because slavery was already entrenched in the territory (bonds people were approximately 16 percent of its population) than because Missouri was located directly west of a free state (Illinois) as well as west of the Mississippi River. Their unwillingness to countenance slavery's encroachment northward and westward initiated a struggle that endangered the Union.

The Congressional Impasse

New York Representative James Tallmadge Jr. ignited the dispute on 13 February 1819, when during the Fifteenth Congress's second session he moved an amendment to a House bill permitting the Missouri Territory to take preparatory steps for statehood. Tallmadge's amendment proposed gradually ending slavery in Missouri by prohibiting the "further introduction" of slaves there and by freeing the children of slaves already in Missouri at statehood when those children reached the age of twenty-five. The House, dominated 105 to 80 by representatives from nonslave states (because population growth in the free states had outstripped the growth rate in slave states), twice that session passed the Missouri bill with Tall-madge's amendment. However, in both instances the more southern-oriented Senate demurred. The Senate was far more evenly divided than the House, reflecting the Union's composition at that time of eleven free states and ten slave states, with free Illinois having a system of black apprentice labor that amounted to quasi-slavery. During the same session, southerners also narrowly defeated a northern effort to prohibit slavery in the Arkansas Territory, that part of the Louisiana Purchase territory below Missouri.

Congress again took up the Missouri question in December 1819, when the Sixteenth Congress convened. With Alabama now a state, southerners had even more power in the Senate. Earlier that year, however, the government of Massachusetts had authorized the district of Maine to separate from it and seek statehood (provided that Congress authorize it by 4 March 1820). Maine's admission promised to augment the number of free states in the country and free-state influence in the Senate. Maine's petition for statehood also came before Congress in December 1819. The Missouri and Maine issues ignited the angriest exchanges among national leaders over slavery's morality and its appropriateness in a democratic republic since the U.S. Constitutional Convention. On 26 January 1820, in the midst of predictions of disunion and war, Representative John W. Taylor of New York offered an even more radically antislavery amendment than Tallmadge's to the House enabling bill for Missouri. This proposal, which would have made all children of slaves in the new state free at birth, received the House's endorsement on 25 February. Meanwhile, the Senate considered its own measures respecting Maine and Missouri.

The Compromise

The breakthrough occurred on 2 March, when, following the recommendation of a House-Senate conference committee, the House voted 90 to 87 to delete the Taylor amendment from its Missouri bill and 134 to 42 to substitute for it an amendment to a competing Senate bill that had been offered by Senator Jesse B. Thomas of Illinois. Thomas's amendment, which had passed the Senate by a 34 to 10 vote on 17 February, prohibited slavery throughout the Louisiana Purchase territory, excepting Missouri, north of 36 degrees 30 minutes. On 3 March, the House and Senate concurred in a conference committee report on statehood for Maine. According to the act approved that day, Maine's statehood would occur on 15 March. The Missouri enabling act, with the Thomas amendment embedded within it as section 8, received President James Monroe's signature and became law on 6 March.

The Missouri question was not completely settled, however, until the Sixteenth Congress's second session (which began on 14 November 1820), after Missouri's proposed state constitution came under consideration. Although most of the document was virtually copied from the constitution of Kentucky and thus was unexceptional, the proposed constitution's twenty-sixth section included wording that called upon the new state's assembly to adopt legislation to prevent "free negroes and mulattoes" from entering and residing in Missouri "under any pretext whatsoever." A select Senate committee endorsed Missouri's admission under this constitution, but the controversial provision sparked heated debate in the full Senate not only on race in America but also, again, on slavery. Missouri's stipulation especially raised the issue of whether blacks were or could be U.S. citizens.

The Senate ultimately evaded the issue by passing on 12 December, without a recorded vote, a resolution endorsing Missouri's statehood, with a proviso previously introduced by Senator John Eaton of Tennessee, stipulating that congressional consent should not be construed as endorsing any clause in Missouri's constitution contravening the "privileges and immunities"—or equal citizenship—clause of the federal constitution. Missouri's constitution encountered more resistance in the House of Representatives, which refused to accept the Senate's resolution, not only delaying Missouri's admission but also throwing into question whether Missouri's three electoral votes should be counted on 14 February 1821, when the electoral votes for the 1820 presidential election were totaled by Congress. In a chaotic scene, the president of the Senate announced the results both with and without Missouri's inclusion. That same month, Representative and former speaker Henry Clay played a key role in resolving the imbroglio over Missouri's constitution, by using his influence to get the matter referred to a joint House-Senate committee. The committee then recommended a resolution (subsequently approved) incorporating the substance of Eaton's proviso, with the added stipulation, sometimes designated the Second Missouri Compromise, that Missouri's state legislature confirm in "a solemn public act" that its constitution abided by Eaton's requirement. Although Missouri's subsequent 26 June declaration denied Congress's right to require such a statement, President Monroe proclaimed Missouri's statehood on 10 August 1821.

Significance of the Compromise

Some historians suggest that the Missouri Compromise is a misnomer because majorities of northerners and southerners did not alike endorse all its key elements. In the House vote deleting Taylor's antislavery provision from the Missouri bill, for example, free-state congressmen voted overwhelmingly, 87 to 14, in favor of retaining the constraint. It was only because four free-staters abstained that compromise forces carried the day. Some historians, moreover, have echoed southern charges at the time and interpreted Tallmadge's initiative as an attempt to revive the fortunes of the fading Federalist Party, since some of the most vehement antislavery diatribes in Tall-madge's support came from Federalist congressmen, most notably Senator Rufus King of New York. If the majority Republican Party split along sectional lines, it might pave the way for a Federalist resurgence. But both Tallmadge and King had earlier demonstrated antislavery tendencies, and historians have yet to uncover documents proving that the amendment originated as a partisan cabal.

Historians further disagree over how to interpret the ringing defenses of slavery issued by southern congressmen in the heat of the debates. One can see such rhetoric as evidence that the northern assault on slavery influenced a gradual shift in southern public opinion from conceding that slavery was evil to proclaiming it a positive good, and that it thus backfired by provoking southerners to relinquish an earlier receptivity to slavery's ultimate abolition. However, the breakdown of voting on the Missouri measures also shows that some southerners remained uncertain about slavery's future. For instance, border slave state representatives voted 16 to 2 for Thomas's barrier against slavery's expansion. Further, as William W. Freehling argues in The Road to Disunion, some southerners who endorsed slavery's continued access to the West argued that this would help diffuse the institution into extinction. What historians do agree on is that northern attacks were prompted, in no small measure, by resentment of the political advantage given the slave states by the three-fifths clause in the U.S. Constitution (which allowed slaves to be counted as population for the purposes of political representation but did not allow them to vote), that northerners and southerners alike felt that the sectional balance of power hinged on the outcome of the dispute, and that significant numbers of southern congressmen had reservations about the precedent set by Thomas's limitation on slavery's future expansion. House Virginians voted 18 to 4 against the 36 degrees 30 minutes provision. Some southerners who endorsed Thomas's constraint apparently did so to get a slave state (Missouri) west of the Mississippi River at a time when only Florida remained for slavery's expansion in the East, and because of a belief that much of the remaining land in the West was desert.

The compromise's 36 degrees 30 minutes line helped to preserve sectional peace for more than thirty years, and might have done so longer had not Texan annexation and the Mexican War greatly enlarged the national domain and caused new sectional divisions over slavery's expansion. Without Congress's repeal of Thomas's provision in the Kansas-Nebraska Act of 1854, it is conceivable that the Civil War would have been considerably delayed, or even prevented. In a postmortem commentary on the Missouri Compromise, U.S. Supreme Court Chief Justice Roger B. Taney's opinion in the Dred Scott case (1857) contended that the already repealed 36 degrees 30 minutes line had been unconstitutional because it violated the property rights of southerners guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. Taney's ruling outraged many northerners, contributing to pre–Civil War sectional tensions.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Cooper, William J. Liberty and Slavery: Southern Politics to 1860. New York: Knopf, 1983.

Dangerfield, George. The Era of Good Feelings. New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1952.

Freehling, William W. The Road to Disunion. Vol. 1, Secessionists at Bay, 1776–1854. New York: Oxford University Press, 1990.

Moore, Glover. The Missouri Controversy, 1819–1821. Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1953.

Morrison, Michael A. Slavery and the American West: The Eclipse of Manifest Destiny and the Coming of the Civil War. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1997.

Remini, Robert V. Henry Clay: Statesman for the Union. New York: Norton, 1991.

Zeitz, Joshua Michael. "The Missouri Compromise Reconsidered: Rhetoric and the Emergence of the Free Labor Synthesis." Journal of the Early Republic 20, no. 3 (Fall 2000): 447–485.

Robert E. May

See also Civil War ; Dred Scott Case ; Kansas-Nebraska Act ; Mason-Dixon Line ; Sectionalism ; Slavery ; Tallmadge Amendment .