An emergency food assessment report issued on 16 September 2002 by the Zimbabwe National Vulnerability Assessment Committee and the Southern African Development Community stated that 6.7 million people in Zimbabwe--about half of the country's population--will require about 486,000 metric tons of emergency cereal food assistance before the main harvest in March-April 2003. (1) Poor food production has plagued Zimbabwe and much of southern Africa since early 2001, when flooding during the latter part of the growing season (January through March) reduced agricultural yields. Too much rain in 2001 was followed by too little in 2002, and dry conditions during that growing season significantly reduced agricultural output.
Food insecurity in Zimbabwe is a result of a combination of factors, not all of which are due to climate. Drought-related food production problems, chaos resulting from violent disputes over the legitimacy of President Robert Mugabe's re-election, and the government's quixotic approach to land redistribution have combined to exacerbate the food shortage. In February 2000, seizure of white-owned farms commenced, and it increased in frequency leading up to the election in March 2002. At that point, Mugabe decided to break up the large white-owned commercial farms for the country's landless war veterans, which reduced the large-scale commercial-sector planted area by 74 percent compared with 2000-01 levels. (2) Due to pressures from the land redistribution program, large-scale commercial cattle stock, which traditionally accounted for up to 90 percent of national beef exports, is estimated to have declined by 70 percent from 1.3 million in December 2001 to 400,000 in July 2002. (3)
In addition to the immediate impact of land redistribution on available food supply, it disrupted seed distribution, which directly affects the 2003 harvest. The Zimbabwe National Vulnerability Assessment Committee's food-security assessment carried out in August reported that 94 percent of farmers did not have seed for the next season's cereal crop. (4)
Most small-scale farmers plant a hybrid maize seed that they purchase from commercial farms. As production and seed distribution slowed, prices increased, leaving small-scale farmers with less and less money to spend on seed. As a result, farmers must fall back on planting second-generation hybrid seeds with very low yield. (5)
As the food crisis in southern Africa moves into its third year, government officials have been informed of the potential consequences of an El Nino event. On 11 July 2002, the U.S. Climate Prediction Center issued an alert: The persistence of warm sea surface temperature anomalies in the central Pacific indicated that an El Nino was forming. In the months since this alert was issued, prediction models have yielded a nearly 100-percent probability that a moderate El Nino will continue for the remainder of 2002 and into early 2003. (6) Perhaps even more convincing are the impacts on climate patterns worldwide-- called teleconnections--that have begun to emerge and are consistent with an El Nino. Negative precipitation anomalies affecting Australia and Indonesia provide further evidence that El Nino is returning.
The near certainty of this forecast suggests that additional impacts should be expected far beyond El Nino's center of action in the tropical Pacific. There is a significant relationship between El Nino and maize production in southern Africa, particularly in Zimbabwe, where about 60 percent of the variance in maize yield is explained by the NINO3 index--an index of El Nino variability. (7) The figure on page 10 illustrates some teleconnections and shows the different degrees of climate-related food insecurity that southern African countries are experiencing.
During El Nino years, significantly below-average rainfall--which results in severe agricultural and hydrologic drought--contributes to reduced food production for both domestic consumption and export. However, new international and domestic political and economic pressures are at work in Zimbabwe as the 2002-03 El Nino develops. Zimbabwe's agricultural sector, which once produced surplus, is in turmoil. The Economist referred to the country as going "from bread basket to basket case." (8) This change is noteworthy because under normal climatic conditions, Zimbabwe (along with South Africa) is a regional food exporter. Other countries in the region, especially Malawi and Zambia, are suffering from severe drought-related food shortages--Zimbabwe's food production problems have propagated into food shortages in other parts of the region.
Mugabe's land redistribution policies have added to a sharp decline in agricultural productivity. In response to charges of election fraud, the Commonwealth nations (those that once were part of the British Empire) suspended Zimbabwe's membership. Although the consequences of suspension are unclear, new technical assistance projects will not be initiated during the suspension. (9) Donor countries have been reluctant to provide food that might reach--and might help provide legitimacy to--only Mugabe's supporters.
While some relief agencies have pledged food aid, Zimbabwe's reluctance to accept genetically modified (GM) foods has led to substantial delays in shipping supplies. In late June, Mugabe agreed to allow maize imports as long as the grain was milled immediately upon arrival in the country. The government expressed concern that unless grain was milled before distribution, it could be used for planting and would hurt Zimbabwe's chances of future export to European consumers who reject GM products. Hence, the issue of inserting GM foods into the food supply--especially during a crisis that leaves little time for planning--runs the risk of creating new economic problems. (10)
To be sure, the Mugabe government is aware of the potential impacts of drought in general and El Nino in particular. In 1982-83 and 1991-92, El Nino adversely affected Zimbabwe's water resources and maize production. (11) In fact, the government has stated that the current "shortage of maize, the country's staple crop, is due solely to a drought that has hit small-scale black farmers who produce 70 percent of national output." (12) Governments in general prefer to blame food crises on natural climate variability as a way of deflecting blame away from agricultural mismanagement or political problems.
In July 2002, the United Nations World Food Programme (WFP) appealed to the international community for $507 million for continuing hunger relief efforts in six southern African countries--Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, Zambia, and Zimbabwe--through March 2003. (13) WFP pointed out that this crisis is more severe than the El Nino drought-related crisis of 1991-92 in that the current situation has been complicated by foreign exchange shortages, government mismanagement, the impacts of HIV/AIDS, and a deteriorating economic situation in the region.
If and when El Nino's influence on Zimbabwe's rainfall takes hold in the 2002-03 growing season, government officials are likely to blame El Nino for the country's severe food shortages. While there is little doubt that El Nino teleconnections to the region can contribute to a decrease in agricultural production, there is also proof that mismanagement of land redistribution and the impacts of recent climate extremes (both wet and dry) already have reduced the country's food security to critical levels.
Food aid donors remain in the difficult position of knowing that decreased rains are forecast to continue throughout the region, leaving little hope for a favorable harvest until March 2004. (14) Meanwhile, food aid to Zimbabwe, while sorely needed by half the country's population, is likely to help keep Mugabe in power. The history of withholding food assistance to influence a government's policy is filled with failure and usually hurts the public rather than those who govern.
(1.) Zimbabwe National Vulnerability Assessment Committee and Southern African Development Community (Food, Agriculture and Natural Resources Vulnerability Committee), "Zimbabwe Emergency Food Security Assessment Report" (Harare, 16 September 2002), accessible via http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/.
(2.) Famine Early Warning Systems Network (FEWS), Zimbabwe Monthly Report, 30 May 2002, accessible via http://www.fews.net/centers/current/monthlies/report/?f=zw&m= 1000586&l=en.
(3.) Ibid.
(4.) FEWS, Zimbabwe Monthly Report, 30 September 2002, accessible via http://www.fews.net/centers/current/monthlies/report/?f=zw&m=1000700& l=en.
(5.) Jennifer Phillips, assistant professor, Bard College, Center for Environmental Policy, Annandale-on-Hudson, New York, personal communication with authors, 7 October 2002.
(6.) International Research Institute for Climate Prediction, "IRI ENSO Update," 16 October 2002, accessed via http://columbia.edu/climate/ENSO/currentinfo/update.htm on 13 November 2002.
(7.) M. A. Cane, G. Eshel, and R. W. Buckland, "Forecasting Zimbabwean Maize Yield Using Eastern Equatorial Pacific Sea Surface Temperature," Nature. 21 July 1994, 204-05.
(8.) "From Bread Basket to Basket Case: Faced with Famine. Robert Mugabe Orders Farmers to Stop Growing Food," The Economist 29 June 2002, 43-44.
(9.) Minelle Fernandez, assistant information and public affairs officer, Communications and Public Affairs Division, Commonwealth Secretariat, London, personal communication with authors, 13 November2002.
(10.) R. Paarlberg. "Genetically Modified Crops in Develop. ing Countries: Promise or Peril?" Environment, January/February 2000, 19-27.
(11.) M. Betsill, M. H. Glantz, and K. Crandall, "Preparing for El Nino: What Role for Forecasts?" Environment, December 1997, 6-13, 26-29.
(12.) Reuters, "Zimbabwe Faces Famine if Food Aid Stalled," The New York Times, 23 July 2002.
(13.) Integrated Regional Information Networks, United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, "Southern Africa: WFP Launches Massive Appeal," 1 July 2002, accessible via http://www.irionews.org/Report.asp?ReportID= 28591.
(14.) International Research Institute for Climate Prediction, "IRI ENSO Update," 16 September 2002.