AT a recent meeting of specialists in Slavic Studies, some of the participants began discussing the views of Alexander Dugin, the popular Russian nationalist philosopher. Most of the Russian participants, mostly Westernized liberals, were unaware of Dugin. This was not the case with the American participants. Not only were they aware of his political stance but even the most minute details of his personality were under their endless scrutiny. For example, a lively debate ensued about whether Dugin sported a beard or had recently shaved it.
The interest in Dugin is justified, for he is one of the few contemporary Russian philosophers who fascinate Westerners. And it is not only academics who are interested in him (an article and a book chapter have recently been devoted to him in scholarly publications). The authoritative American journal Foreign Affairs also published an article on Dugin. Their profile asserted that his views were actually those of the Russian elite. The article has its merit for Dugin's works (and he is a prolific author) are used as textbooks in the Russian military academy, and he is also an adviser to Seleznev, the Speaker of the Russian Duma (parliament). In spite of the amicable meeting between President Putin and President Bush in June there are still underlying tensions between Russia and the United States. The views of this Russian nationalist philosopher therefore deserve exploring.
Dugin belongs to the school of what is called Eurasianism, a philosophical and quasi-political movement that began with Russian emigres who had fled the Bolshevik regime in the 1920s. Eurasianists were in many ways similar to traditional Russian nationalists. For example, they believed in the corporate/collectivist nature of Russia/Eurasia and asserted that Western-style democracy was foreign to the country's political culture. They also berated the West for its absence of a grand goal and a sense of spiritual messianism. For them, the West was crass, materialistic and, of course, morally rotten. What made the various brands of Eurasianists different from traditional Russian nationalists was their assumption that Russia's spiritual tone was not so much Slavic as Asian in origin. The leftist branch of the movement soon forgot about its anti-Bolshevik stand and began to identify with the communists. In their view the Marxist coating of the regime was merely a thin veneer, and beneath it one could easily discer n that the Bolsheviks were traditional Russian nationalists/Eurasiansists because they had made Russia strong again and had established an empire.
Since the collapse of the Soviet regime, there has been a growing dissatisfaction with the West, and the Eurasianists' views are becoming increasingly popular among various groups of the Russian nationalistic elite. Dugin is the most prominent spokesman for this group of intellectuals, and thus while planning my trip to Russia recently I thought it might be a good idea to interview him. I was anxious to meet this prophet of the coming nationalistic revolution which would lead Russia/Eurasia to a final Armageddon with the West.
The location of Dugin's headquarters in itself is interesting because of what it says about the new Russia. His office is located close to the Novodevechy Monastery, a burial place for important people. It was built in the sixteenth -- seventeenth centuries, and is in comparatively good shape. White walls and the golden cupolas of the churches can be seen clearly against the screen of the blue sky. A big oval pond is near the wall, and children swim there despite the dubious cleanliness of the water.
Library 27
Library 27, where Dugin lives and works, is placed in a typical Moscow apartment building and residents of the building are seemingly unaware of its existence. However, I found the perennial Russian babushkas, old ladies who usually chat on the benches, and they pointed out the library, which is small and unimposing. It is one of the numerous regional libraries that are scattered all over the city. These libraries were designed to provide local residents with intellectual nourishment, but apparently have fallen into misuse. The authorities have meager funds to maintain them, and even more meagre funding for the purchasing of books. Most of the books are relics of the Soviet regime, and this is one of the major reasons that the libraries are not well attended.
Outside his headquarters I paused to rest for a moment on one of the benches. The humbleness of the place where one of the major ideologists of the coming nationalistic Russia has established his headquarters was in sharp contrast to the grandness of his proclaimed goal and mission. The scenario was serene. White clouds moved gently along the blue horizon, birds chirped in the trees, and the crows moved in a solemn dance around the golden copulas. The children continued their swimming exercises in the pond, and the babushkas proceeded with their grave and slow discussions about their grandchildren, prices, and pensions.
Downtown Moscow, an hour or so away on the underground, with its businesses, Mercedeses, leggy girls, and expensive shops with mostly Western goods, seemed to be millennia away. While downtown everything is in flux, in a rush, trying to emulate the fluidity and energy of the West, here everything is tranquil and fixed. You feel that nothing substantial has changed here for centuries. It is not the West but the East. And by this I do not mean the Westernized East of the Pacific rim which has absorbed the ideas and the principles of the West in order to compete with it for global power and domination. This is the other East, the East of the heartland, Eurasia, a land which is unwilling and unable to change.
Inside, in the small library, books from Dugin's publishing house were on display. They were mostly works on geopolitics, philosophy, and similar fields. A young girl rearranged them with stern seriousness. After a while Dugin came in. A young man in his thirties with a pointed beard and clever lean face, he was confident and articulate. It was clear that he had discussed this subject with many visitors.
'A confrontation between the West and Eurasia is inevitable', he began. 'And I was the first to state this. I was the first who made this clear even in the beginning of the Yeltsin era, when everyone was confident that Russia would become a part of the West. Everyone who has stated that Russia will clash with the West took these ideas from me. And what I say is on the mind of the Russian elite'. Here Dugin added that some members of the elite have complained to him because he has disclosed their private viewpoints to public scrutiny. 'And I respond -- this is not true. I do not disclose their ideas, they merely follow mine'.
'Who will lead this new Russia against the West'? I asked him. 'The communists? The national communists? I read their publications, especially Zavtra (Tomorrow) and what is preached is absolute gibberish'. Now, Zavtra is the main vehicle for what is called the red-to-brown movement, a loose coalition of nationalistic-minded communists. Their main concern is not so much the end of socialism as the end of the mighty USSR (read Russian empire). Those who follow this line of thinking see Yeltsin as a usurper and, of course, an unwitting tool of cunning Jews. The paper's contributors assume that the Russian people are prepared for a revolt that would bring them to power. The newspaper has been predicting the imminent revolution for years, but so far it all has been an illusion.
Here I added that since I had been in Moscow it seemed more like an illusion than it had back in America. From American shores, the rhetoric is deceptive. Wounded national pride, the war in the Balkans -- all of this should lead to a violent response from the Russians, at least from the perspective of Western logic. But you only need to be in Moscow, look at the people and talk with the people to find out that this is absolute gibberish. The whole thing -- the call to rise against Yeltsin, to fight for Orthodox brother Slays, to resurrect the mighty USSR -- is absolute stupidity. No one will rise for the communist/nationalist regime. Indeed, an absolute cynicism and passivity prevails throughout the country, I told him, trying to provoke a response.
I looked at his eyes once again. No, he was not the man I had expected to see. He was not what I would call a true believer. I have not read many of his books, but I have read most of his articles in Zavtra. There are several pages in the newspaper, actually a newspaper within the paper, that publishes Dugin's work along with that of similar folk. Many of these articles, including those of Dugin, are written in a semi-mystical language that emphasizes that the Orthodox civilization of Russia/Eurasia will collide inevitably with the West. A grand explosion, presumably nuclear, will be the final outcome of this confrontation. In these articles Dugin's hatred of the West is so intense that he regards the flames of mutual self-destruction as a better alternative to that of existence of the West. According to these articles, one could assume that Dugin was a true believer, a fanatic of the cause who cannot think rationally and look at himself and his ideas from the outside. I know some people with this frame of m ind in Russia. One of them was Svetlana Semenova, the leading specialist on the extravagant Russian philosopher Nikolai Fedorov (d. 1903). Fedorov's ideas were bizarre, or at least they were out of tune with anything that Western philosophy had ever proposed. He believed that the goal of mankind is the physical resurrection of the dead. He thought that this would be possible when humanity would abandon such follies as sex, which, he believed, was an essential aspect of Western civilization. As soon as the West would forsake its sexual drive, focus on the love of its dead ancestors, and unite around Russia, the grand project of the resurrection of the dead could be started. Then humanity's resurrected and immortal ancestors could be resettled all over the universe.
Semenova and her extravagant husband, the philosopher Gachev, took Fedorov's project at its face value. Any critical statement or, God forbid, joke about the project, caused her intense pain. She is a good example of the sort of true believers who can still be found in Russia and who have discarded the practical implications of their goals.
And I expected Dugin to follow this line of thought and preach to me passionately about a grand, cataclysmic event, the nuclear confrontation of the West and Russia in a final Armageddon of self-destruction. I expected to find a possessed fanatic, yet this was not the case. He elaborated confidently and rationally on the reasons why a confrontation between Russia and the West was inevitable. Unexpectedly, he denounced Zavtra and the red-to-browns, with whom he supposedly should be in agreement.
He said: 'I agree with you that Communists and Zavtra have no future. Zavtra's calls for uprising are hysterical and pathetic. Who would listen to them? The Communists are also at a dead end', he added. 'There are two problems here. To start with, despite all of their screaming, they are no longer truly the opposition. They have become part of the establishment, and if they would win they would act practically in the same way as the present day regime. Nothing radical could be expected. And secondly, they are Moscow-centered and anti-Semites. Their plan is to resurrect the old Soviet or Russian tsarist empire, the highly centralized bureaucratic body with Russians as a dominant ethnic group. No one would follow them. Their plan is a road to failure'. Then Dugin used a phrase, a familiar quote, that was uttered exactly 80 years ago by an ex-White officer, who was discussing Russia's future on the eve of the Bolshevik victory. Salvation will not come from this side, not from the side of the opposition.
Revolutionaries as Counter-Revolutionaries
In 1919 when Russia was in the midst of the Civil War, developments in the country in many ways followed the present day scenario. The only difference was that they were much more rapid and catastrophic. In February 1917, the Imperial Government had collapsed almost over night, with practically no resistance. In a similar way the Communist regime ended in 1991. In both of these cases, the events were celebrated as the beginning of a new era, an era of happiness and ideal democracy. After both events, it was believed that Russia would enter the family of Western democracy, and that success in all directions would follow. In the case of the February Revolution, it was believed that the Russian army would defeat the Germans and Austro-Hungarians in the First World War. It was also believed that the economic problems in the country would be fixed.
This same feeling was shared by the majority of those who witnessed the anti-Communist revolution and the collapse of the USSR that had followed the end of the communist regime. They dreamed that the new post-Communist Russia would enter a period of economic prosperity, and at the same time, the international standing of the new Russia could be upheld and Russia would be seen as an equal among the Western nations. All of these hopes were crushed soon enough. Both in 1917 and in 1991 the economy entered a speedy decline and the state disintegrated while the spread of crime and other asocial problems provided a great push toward anarchy. 1917 was different from 1991 in one perspective: this disintegration, the push for anarchy, was much stronger, and Russia had a civil war.
For quite a few historians, the reason why the Red Bolsheviks defeated their opponents, the Whites, was clear. The Whites represented the landlords and capitalists, the middle class which lost during the revolution most of its riches. While this was undoubtedly true for quite a few of the Whites, many others confronted the Bolsheviks for quite a different reason. Quite a few of them, especially the officers who represented the military elite, hated the Bolsheviks because they saw them as giving short shrift to the state. These Whites saw the Bolsheviks as the people who had incited the soldiers to desert, thus opening the road for advancing Germans. They also blamed the Bolsheviks for inciting the local separatism that had led to the disintegration of the Russian empire. It was not a concern for their material interests, but a desire to preserve Russia as united and indivisible, to restore the country to its previous glory, that pushed many of them to oppose the Bolsheviks, yet it was the Bolsheviks who won the Civil War and united Russia and actually fulfilled the dreams of Nationalistic-minded Whites.
At the same time it is the present day Communist-Nationalists, such as Zyuganov, who bemoan the lack of a mighty Russian state and dream of resurrecting the USSR, and paradoxically enough, play the role of the Whites of the Civil War. I thought over all of this when Dugin repeated, Salvation will not come from this side, not from the side of the opposition. 'Why'? I asked him.
According to Dugin, the reasons are clear enough. Despite their rhetoric, the present day communists have lost their ability to incite the Russian public. Thus, they are impotent, powerless to confront the current regime. He went on passionately: 'Have they created any underground opposition to the regime? Do they readily sacrifice themselves for the creation of a state that is ready to confront the West? Definitely not. Even if they would come to power they would follow the line of the present regime. They would not make many changes'.
Here I asked him what would happen if they did come to power and tried to resurrect the Soviet state. One should not discard the possibility. Dugin believed that their attempts could not work as they have no new ideas on how to build a state that would be able to confront the West. His point here was that the Communist-Nationalist programme is really only centuries-old Russian nationalism framed in Moscow-centered bureaucratic centralism.
'What other model could they follow'? I asked. Dugin's theory is that Russian nationalism and the centralism of the Russian state were the reasons for the collapse of the USSR. And here is where his Eurasianist viewpoint is most evident. He said that in the Russian-dominated state of the USSR, the people of Eurasia had seen themselves as subjugated. They were not ready to see Russia as their ally. The new Eurasian state would emerge as the broadest political and economic decentralization. Each of Russia's regions would receive as much freedom in its political and social arrangements as it wished. Those regions with predominantly Muslim populations could live according to their strict Muslim laws. Even polygamy would be permitted. In those regions where the population still believed in Communism, they could build a Communist regime if they wished. The variety of politico-social combinations could be endless.
I expressed doubt about such arrangements. Why should all of these different regions of Eurasia be united? For only one reason, according to Dugin: the confrontation with the West. Moreover, it would be the present elite, including the financial tycoons, that would be the founders of this new anti-Western state, the new Eurasia that would collide with the West.
I stated here that the transformation of the present day post-Soviet elite into anti-Western Eurasianists would be even less likely than the transformation of Bolsheviks into Russian nationalists, into national Bolsheviks. The point here is that Bolsheviks were hostile to the West from the start. More importantly, the Bolsheviks were economically self-sufficient. Their economic reliance on the West was minimal. It is true that Stalin received some technical expertise from the West, but it was limited. There were no loans, no food supplied (barring the short period of famine in 1920/21), and definitely no transfer of capital abroad. Stalinist Russia was a closed and self-sufficient society, a society organized for the future war with the West. (The West was seen here in holistic terms and Japan was regarded as part of the West.)
The Elite and the West
All of this does not work in post-Soviet Russia where the elite has tried its best to be integrated in the West. There is a vested interest of the newborn Russian elite to maintain a good relationship with the West. The Russian elite wishes to receive Western loans. These loans are actually gifts, for it is clear to all parties that Russia has no intention of ever repaying them. More importantly, the West is a haven for their capital.
The point here is that money and power are tightly connected in present day Russia. There is no such thing as private property, as it is known in the West. An individual's property rights depend on his relationship to the holder of power, especially in the case of such lucrative property as oil and other natural resources. Money is not safe, and for this reason the new Russians, the emerging rich, send their money to Western banks. This is one of the major reasons why the elite will try to maintain a good relationship with the West.
The same concern for money and property is what has made them allies of Yeltsin's and now Putin's regime, which despite its political vacillation remains a pro-Western force. A change in political leadership could easily lead to the re-division of property, and this is another reason why the present-day post-Soviet elite was so concerned with the transition to the post-Yeltsin era.
Thus, for various reasons, the elite sees a good relationship with the West as critical. And because of this I think it would be unbelievable to assume that the present day Russian elite would turn against the West.
Dugin argued against my position in the following way: First, he disagreed with my statement that the present day elite sees the West as indispensable to their economic well-being. As a matter of fact, in Dugin's view, the present day Russian financial oligarchy could hardly be incorporated into the Western economy. The logic of events will lead them to a confrontation with the West. And here he pointed to Boris Berezovsky, the financial tycoon who has been actively involved in politics and is seen by some people as a king maker.
Berezovsky and similar members of the Russian economic and political elite, Dugin stated, would not be able to function in the West. All of them are criminals, or at least semi-criminals, and cannot become a part of the Western economic system. Dugin pointed to the scandal with the Bank of New York where several of the bank's employees had been linked to money laundering. These sort of scandals endanger the ability of Russia to attract new loans from the West (and much of these loans go directly into the pockets of the Russian bureaucracy). Eventually these scandals will have serious repercussions, and the money the tycoons have in Western banks might not be safe in the future.
Recent developments give some credibility to Dugin's assumptions that the Westernism of the present day Russian oligarchy, whether they are ethnic Russians or Jewish, is a fleeting phenomenon, and that they will eventually have to join the Russian nationalists and prepare Eurasia for a showdown with its arch enemy, the United States. Dugin ended our conversation with the ominous statement that the perceived passivity of the Russian populace is deceptive and a great confrontation lies ahead. He also added that in the confrontation with the USA, Russia-Eurasia will not stand alone and will be able to assemble around herself a mighty alliance of assorted nations ranging from Israel to Iran.
The Importance of Dugin's Views
I was ready to part, for Dugin's time was in short supply. While he rounded off before my eyes the prospect of a grand alliance of Russia, Iran, Central Asia, and possibly even Israel to confront Nato, another visitor was already waiting to talk to him. He, too, was a representative of the country which Dugin viewed as the mortal enemy of Russia/Eurasia, the United States.
Dugin's views, i.e., the sense of hostility to the West, seem to be spreading among the Russian elite, and not only among those who disagree with the government. In a public radio interview, the editor of one of the new Russian magazines stated that Russia and Nato are on a collision course and the Russian elite should strengthen the country's armed forces to be ready for all eventualities.
In the editor's view, the West in general and America in particular have done their best to destroy Russia. Russians, he continued, should drop their illusions about the West and be quite pragmatic and even cynical in dealing with the West. He stated that present day Russians would be wise not to follow the example of Nicholas II. He had fought for peace, just as Brezhnev had. The results of these struggles for peace were a disaster, the commentator emphasized. Russia experienced devasting defeats and the revolutions that led to Nicholas' death. Russians should look not to him but to Alexander III, who did not fight for peace. Alexander understood that the West was Russia's enemy and prepared for the war. And it was Alexander's policy that made Russia a powerful and influential player in global affairs. The commentator implied that the present day Russian elite should follow the road of Alexander's pragmatic nationalism.
How should one view the statements of Dugin and similar people about the inevitable confrontation of Russia/Eurasia with the West? Some of them should be carefully scrutinized. There are those who state that unless Russia is engaged the present day Russian elite will follow the Weimar scenario, and a Russian Hitler will come to power. This scenario is not only pleasing to the Russian elite for it implies a direct economic benefit, but it is also pleasing to Western scholars in Russian studies. For them, the prospect of a mighty nationalistic Russia threatening to confront the West also entails various materialistic benefits -- i.e., a better job market, fatter grants, easiness of publications, etc. This certainly explains their interest in Dugin and similar figures who are practically unknown in their own country but popular in the West.
Moreover, Dugin and other Russian nationalists do not seem to grasp the practical implications, both in their own lives and for Russia, of a confrontation with the West. In a nationalistic/authoritarian state Dugin would hardly be allowed to entertain foreigners. Quite likely a new wave of terrorism would consume Dugin and similar extravagant thinkers regardless of their professed love for a nationalistic order. For, as protagonists of the French and Russian Revolutions discovered long ago, revolutions usually eat their children. For the general population, the new political arrangement would call for a strict work discipline, conscription and, of course, a further decline in the already low standard of living.
And it would be wrong to assume that many members of the Russian elite, despite their anti-Western rhetoric, are not aware of these implications. Most members of the elite do not want to confront the West. Thus, the pronouncements of people like Dugin might not be the beginning of a round of confrontation with the West, but actually the heralding of the new Russia's retreat, which could finally lead to the country's disintegration, its transformation into a loose coalition of fiefdoms. Yet despite these caveats, one should not totally discard Dugin's views for they might indicate an important new political trend in the country.
To start with, his views indicate that it would be a mistake to assume that the rise of an anti-Western regime could only come from the Communist/Nationalist opposition to the current elite, from those who are usually called the red-to-brown. The current elite could well change from its pro-Western stance almost overnight, especially if it found out that its money was no longer safe in Western banks or that there would be no more Western loans. While a Weimarian transformation (the rise of a Russian Hitler) of the country, of course, is not the only option in such a case, the other alternatives (and they cannot all be foreseen for the combinations could be unexpected or even bizarre) could be as troubling for the West. And this is the reason why Dugin cannot be ignored.
Dmitry Shlapentokh teaches Russian history at Indiana University South Bend. He is the author of two books comparing the Russian and the French Revolution.