MARKET AND COST STRUCTURE IN THE U.S. BEEF PACKING INDUSTRY: A PLANT-LEVEL ANALYSIS.

From: American Journal of Agricultural Economics | Date: February 1, 2001| Author: MORRISON PAUL, CATHERINE J. | Copyright information

A resurgence of consolidation in the U.S. meat packing industry in the past few decades has stimulated academic and policy debate. Issues raised include the role of cost economies in driving these patterns, and the effects on the agricultural sector (cattle producers) from market power. Here, plant level cost and revenue data for U.S. beef packing plants are used to estimate a cost-based model incorporating cattle- and output-market pricing behavior. The robust results indicate litt...

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