Intelligent design; Economics focus.(Nobel prize in economics)

From: The Economist (US) | Date: October 20, 2007 | Copyright information

A theory of an intelligently guided invisible hand wins the Nobel prize

"WHAT on earth is mechanism design?" was the typical reaction to this year's Nobel prize in economics, announced on October 15th. In this era of "Freakonomics", in which everyone is discovering their inner economist, economics has become unexpectedly sexy. So what possessed the Nobel committee to honour a subject that sounds so thoroughly dismal? Why didn't they follow the lead of the peace-prize ju...

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