Vaibhasika metaphoricalism. From: Philosophy East and West | Date: July 1, 2005| Author: Goodman, Charles | COPYRIGHT 2005 University of Hawaii Press. This material is published under license from the publisher through the Gale Group, Farmington Hills, Michigan.  All inquiries regarding rights should be directed to the Gale Group.Copyright information

Contrary to what almost everyone thinks, there is no such thing as a persisting, separate, individual self. Westerners have often regarded this view, known as the doctrine of no-self (anatta/anatman), as the most intriguing and important claim made by the Buddhist philosophical tradition. One promising way to understand the doctrine is to compare it to the work of those contemporary analytic philosophers who have rejected the belief in a substantive self--most notably Derek Parfit. ...

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