Legal realism as theory of law.

From: William and Mary Law Review | Date: April 1, 2005| Author: Green, Michael Steven | Copyright information
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
INTRODUCTION 
I. THE REALISTS' THEORIES OF LAW 
   A. What Are Legal Rules? 
   B. What Is the Prediction Theory of Law? 
   C. Did the Realists Have a Novel Theory of Law at All? 
II. HART ON THE NORMATIVITY OF LAW 
   A. Hart's Theory of Law 
   B. Can Hart Explain the Law's Normativity? 
   C. Shared Cooperative Activities? 
   D. The Revenge of the Natural Law Theorist 
   E. Non-Cognitivism and the Internal Point of View 
III. THE FIRST ARGUMENT AGAINST LEGAL R...

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